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CHIPPING AWAY AT THE ROCK: PEREZ V.
MORTGAGE BANKERS ASSOCIATION AND THE
SEMINOLE ROCK DEFERENCE DOCTRINE
Kevin O. Leske∗
Largely escaping judicial and scholarly examination for close to
seventy years, the Seminole Rock deference doctrine directs federal
courts to defer to an administrative agency’s interpretation of its own
regulation unless such interpretation “is plainly erroneous or
inconsistent with the regulation.” But at long last the United States
Supreme Court is poised to re-evaluate the doctrine.
In March 2015, in Perez v. Mortgage Bankers Association, the
Court addressed whether a federal agency was required to follow the
notice-and-comment procedures of the Administrative Procedure Act
after it changed a prior interpretation of its regulation under the
“Paralyzed Veterans doctrine.” Although the Supreme Court
unanimously found the Paralyzed Veterans doctrine impermissible,
thereby restoring the plain language requirements of the Administrative
Procedure Act, the case implicated the Seminole Rock deference
doctrine, especially through the several concurring opinions, which
focused exclusively on the doctrine.
Accordingly, this Article explores the justices’ various opinions
in order to explain the compelling practical and constitutional reasons
why the Seminole Rock regime cannot be ignored any further. The
Article concludes that when the Supreme Court re-examines the
doctrine, it should do so with the intent to bring clarity to this important
area of federal administrative law.

∗ Associate Professor of Law, Barry University School of Law. I would like to thank Dean
Leticia Diaz for her support. I am also grateful to the editors and staff of the Loyola of Los
Angeles Law Review for their excellent work.
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I. INTRODUCTION
In 1945, the United States Supreme Court, in Bowles v.
Seminole Rock & Sand Co.,1 held federal courts must defer to an
administrative agency’s interpretation of its own regulation unless
the interpretation “is plainly erroneous or inconsistent with the
regulation.”2 This deference doctrine has significant practical
ramifications because, through the evolution of our administrative
state, agency regulations have become the key way whereby the
rights and obligations of private parties are established.3
It is therefore unsurprising that Seminole Rock questions “arise
as a matter of course on a regular basis” during judicial review.4
However, despite its importance to the regulated community (and to
the administrative state, in general), the Seminole Rock deference
regime has not received anywhere near the attention lavished on the
Chevron doctrine,5 its “doctrinal cousin,” which applies to a court’s
review of a statutory provision.6
But why should we be concerned with the existing Seminole
Rock standard? In short, there are several constitutional and practical
problems with affording agencies a level of deference that scholars
1. 325 U.S. 410 (1945).
2. Id. at 414. The Seminole Rock doctrine has been more recently referred to as “Auer
deference” as a result of the case of Auer v. Robbins, 519 U.S. 452, 461 (1997). It remains a
mystery why the courts, as well as the legal community, began calling it Auer deference, instead
of Seminole Rock deference. See William N. Eskridge, Jr. & Lauren E. Baer, The Continuum of
Deference: Supreme Court Treatment of Agency Statutory Interpretations from Chevron to
Hamdan, 96 GEO. L.J. 1083, 1088–89 & n.26 (2008) (observing and seeking to explain Justice
Scalia’s use of the term in his dissent in Gonzales v. Oregon, 546 U.S. 243, 277 (2006) (Scalia, J.,
dissenting)).
3. See John F. Manning, Constitutional Structure and Judicial Deference to Agency
Interpretations of Agency Rules, 96 COLUM. L. REV. 612, 614–15 (1996) (explaining because
agency rules affect the public’s legal rights more directly than statutes, the Seminole Rock
doctrine requires closer scrutiny); see also Decker v. Nw. Envtl. Def. Ctr., 133 S. Ct. 1326, 1339
(2013) (Roberts, C.J., concurring) (stating that the Seminole Rock doctrine goes “to the heart of
administrative law”).
4. Decker, 133 S. Ct. at 1339 (Roberts, C.J., concurring).
5. Kevin O. Leske, Between Seminole Rock and a Hard Place: A New Approach to Agency
Deference, 46 CONN. L. REV. 227, 229 (2013) [hereinafter Leske, Between Seminole Rock and a
Hard Place] (asserting unlike Chevron, the Seminole Rock deference doctrine has “gone largely
unexamined”); Scott H. Angstreich, Shoring Up Chevron: A Defense of Seminole Rock
Deference to Agency Regulatory Interpretations, 34 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 49, 99 (2000) (The
Seminole Rock deference doctrine has “lurked beneath the surface and evaded scholarly and
judicial criticism.”); see also cf. Russell L. Weaver, Judicial Interpretation of Administrative
Regulations: The Deference Rule, 45 U. PITT. L. REV. 587, 589 (1984) (“Although commentators
have lavished attention on the subject of statutory construction, they have virtually ignored the
problem of how to interpret regulations.”).
6. Chevron, U.S.A., Inc. v. Nat. Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 842–43 (1984).
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have referred to as “controlling” deference because it essentially
compels a court to accept the agency’s interpretation of an
ambiguous regulatory provision.7
One constitutional concern is that the Seminole Rock standard
raises separation of powers issues. Professor John F. Manning’s 1996
law review article details how deferring to an administrative agency
under Seminole Rock effectively permits the agency to both make the
law (because its regulation has the force of law) and also interpret
that “law” (because it receives controlling deference for its
subsequent interpretation).8 According to Manning, such an ability of
“self-interpretation”9 “contradicts a major premise of our
constitutional scheme and of contemporary separation of powers case
law—that a fusion of lawmaking and law-exposition is especially
dangerous to our liberties.”10
And leading up to the Court’s recent interest in the doctrine,
scholars have asserted the Seminole Rock standard can encourage an
agency “to promulgate excessively vague legislative rules” and
“leave the more difficult task of specification to the more flexible
and unaccountable process of later ‘interpreting’ these open-ended
regulations.”11 More simply stated, an agency need not speak with

7. As I did in my past articles on the Seminole Rock doctrine, Leske, Between Seminole
Rock and a Hard Place, supra note 5, at 230, and Kevin O. Leske, Splits in the Rock: The
Conflicting Interpretations of the Seminole Rock Deference Doctrine by the U.S. Courts of
Appeals, 66 ADMIN. L. REV. 787 (2014) [hereinafter Leske, Splits in the Rock], I will refer to
Seminole Rock deference as “controlling” deference because it conforms to the Court’s view that
the agency’s “administrative interpretation . . . becomes of controlling weight unless it is plainly
erroneous or inconsistent with the regulation.” Bowles, 325 U.S. at 414; accord Weaver, supra
note 5, at 591 (calling certain deference rules, including Seminole Rock’s, “controlling” because
they are outcome determinative).
Although other scholars have referred to it as “binding deference,” the effect is the same.
See Manning, supra note 3, at 617 (discussing the concept of “binding deference,” which requires
“a reviewing court to accept an agency’s reasonable interpretation of ambiguous legal texts, even
when a court would construe those materials differently as a matter of first impression”).
8. See Manning, supra note 3, at 638–39, 654, 696 (discussing the “separation of
lawmaking from law-exposition,” and arguing that the Seminole Rock standard fails the
separation of powers analysis).
9. See Manning, supra note 3, at 655 (“The right of self-interpretation under Seminole Rock
removes an important affirmative reason for the agency to express itself clearly; since the agency
can say what its own regulations mean (unless the agency’s view is plainly erroneous), the agency
bears little, if any, risk of its own opacity or imprecision.”).
10. Manning, supra note 3, at 617.
11. Lars Noah, Divining Regulatory Intent: The Place for a “Legislative History” of Agency
Rules, 51 HASTINGS L.J. 255, 290 (2000); see also Robert A. Anthony & Michael Asimow, The
Court’s Deferences―A Foolish Inconsistency, 26 ADMIN. & REG. L. NEWS, 10, 10–11 (2000)
(suggesting if an agency knows that a court will defer to its regulatory interpretation, it creates “a
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clarity when promulgating regulations because it knows it will be
given deference when it subsequently interprets its vague regulation
informally (i.e., without engaging in the notice-and-comment process
of the Administrative Procedure Act (APA)).12
Relatedly, the Seminole Rock deference doctrine—as it has been
currently interpreted and applied by courts—conflicts with the APA.
The APA directs courts to determine “the meaning or applicability of
the terms of an agency action.”13 But Seminole Rock’s controlling
deference standard completely undermines the court’s role in this
respect. By applying the Seminole Rock standard, no longer do
“affected persons . . . [have] recourse to an independent judicial
interpreter of the agency’s legislative act.”14 The loss of the court as
a “check” on the propriety of an agency regulation is especially
troublesome because “the agency is often an adverse party” in a case
involving the interpretation of that regulation.15
Starting in 2011, however, members of the Court have begun to
highlight their interest in re-evaluating the Seminole Rock doctrine.16
Justice Scalia has been especially insistent in conveying his
newfound discontent with the doctrine. First, in Talk America, Inc. v.
powerful incentive for agencies to issue vague regulations, with the thought of creating the
operative regulatory substance later through informal interpretations”).
12. Administrative Procedure Act (APA), 5 U.S.C. § 552 (2012); see Thomas Jefferson
Univ. v. Shalala, 512 U.S. 504, 525 (1994) (Thomas, J., dissenting) (“It is perfectly
understandable, of course, for an agency to issue vague regulations, because to do so maximizes
agency power and allows the agency greater latitude to make law through adjudication rather than
through the more cumbersome rulemaking process.”); see also Kristin E. Hickman & Matthew D.
Krueger, In Search of the Modern Skidmore Standard, 107 COLUM. L. REV. 1235, 1309 (2007)
(stating “the [Seminole Rock] doctrine may tempt agencies to issue vague regulations through the
relatively burdensome notice-and-comment process”).
13. Robert A. Anthony, The Supreme Court and the APA: Sometimes They Just Don’t Get It,
10 ADMIN. L.J. 1, 9–10 (1996) (arguing § 706 of the APA requires a court to determine the
meaning of the terms of an agency action thereby “arm[ing] affected persons with recourse to an
independent judicial interpreter of the agency’s legislative act, where, after all, the agency is often
an adverse party”).
14. Anthony, supra note 13, at 9. Professor Anthony asserts that the Seminole Rock doctrine
contradicts the APA’s purpose in another way: by allowing an “exception for interpretative rules
in § 553” because such rules should be subject to “plenary judicial review.” Anthony & Asimow,
supra note 11, at 11 (citation omitted).
15. Anthony, supra note 13, at 9.
16. This is not to say the Court has been completely silent on the doctrine. See, e.g., Mullins
Coal Co. of Va. v. Dir., Office of Workers’ Comp. Programs, U.S. Dep’t of Labor, 484 U.S. 135,
170 (1987) (Marshall, J., dissenting) (Seminole Rock deference must not be “a license for an
agency effectively to rewrite a regulation through interpretation.”) (citing Bowles, 325 U.S. at
414); Thomas Jefferson Univ., 512 U.S. at 525 (Thomas, J., dissenting) (stating “agency rules
should be clear and definite so that affected parties will have adequate notice concerning the
agency’s understanding of the law.”); see generally, Leske, Between Seminole Rock and a Hard
Place, supra note 5 (reviewing the development of the doctrine).

380

LOYOLA OF LOS ANGELES LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 49:375

Michigan Bell Telephone Co.,17 he observed that he “in the past
[had] uncritically accepted that [deference] rule,” but now he had
“become increasingly doubtful of its validity.”18 He expressly
indicated he would be receptive to reconsidering the doctrine in a
future case.19 The following year, in Decker v. Northwest
Environmental Defense Center,20 Justice Scalia took his objections a
step further by stating he would abandon the doctrine because it had
“no principled basis [and] contravenes one of the great rules of
separation of powers [that he] who writes a law must not adjudge its
violation.”21 No doubt prompted by Justice Scalia’s opinion, Chief
Justice Roberts, joined by Justice Alito, wrote separately to concede
that it “may be appropriate to reconsider that principle in an
appropriate case” where “the issue is properly raised and argued.”22
The chief justice concluded by emphasizing the legal community
should now be “aware that there is some interest in reconsidering
those cases.”23
The Court’s concern for the issues raised by the Seminole Rock
doctrine reached its apex in 2015 in Perez v. Mortgage Bankers
Association.24 Although the case did not directly raise the doctrine,
the Court addressed a related doctrine conceived by the United States
Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit involving the
notice-and-comment procedures under the APA.25 Under the
Paralyzed Veterans doctrine “[o]nce an agency gives its regulation
an interpretation, it can only change that interpretation as it would
formally modify the regulation itself: through the process of notice
and comment rulemaking.”26
In its March 2015 decision, the Court unanimously struck down
the D.C. Circuit’s Paralyzed Veterans doctrine.27 Notably, however,
17. 131 S. Ct. 2254 (2011).
18. Id. at 2266 (Scalia, J., concurring).
19. Id.
20. 133 S. Ct. 1326 (2013).
21. Id. at 1342 (Scalia, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (stating that “I believe
that it is time to do so”).
22. Id. at 1338–39 (Roberts, C.J., concurring).
23. Id.
24. 135 S. Ct. 1199 (2015).
25. Id.
26. Paralyzed Veterans of Am. v. D.C. Arena L.P., 117 F.3d 579, 586 (D.C. Cir. 1997). The
court revisited (and re-affirmed) this holding later in Alaska Professional Hunters Ass’n v.
Federal Aviation Administration, 177 F.3d 1030, 1034 (D.C. Cir.1999), but the doctrine is most
often cited as the Paralyzed Veterans doctrine.
27. Perez, 135 S. Ct. 1199 (2015).
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the majority opinion was narrowly written and was accompanied by
several concurring opinions that wrote more broadly on agency
deference issues.28 Specifically, Justices Alito, Scalia, and Thomas
each penned opinions concurring in the judgment, but they focused
on the Seminole Rock deference doctrine and expressed their views
that the doctrine should be re-evaluated.29
With now four justices (which is generally regarded as the
number of “votes” necessary to grant a petition for a writ of
certiorari)30 expressly interested in re-evaluating the doctrine in an
appropriate case, there seems little doubt that the Court will soon
hear a case implicating the doctrine. Accordingly, this Article
analyzes the Court’s various opinions in Mortgage Bankers, which
will likely prove pivotal to Seminole Rock’s future.
Part I of this Article begins by briefly reviewing the Seminole
Rock doctrine, its theoretical underpinnings, and the Supreme
Court’s recent interest in the doctrine.31 Part II explains the
Paralyzed Veterans doctrine, which was the basis for the appeal in
the Mortgage Bankers case. Part III then analyzes the Court’s
opinions in Mortgage Bankers to highlight the key concerns, as well
as to evaluate the views of members of the Court, which will likely
be “in play” during the full Court’s near certain re-examination. The
Article concludes that the legitimate constitutional and practical
problems expressed by these justices favor re-evaluating the doctrine
in a way that would mitigate these concerns to bring more fairness
and consistency to our administrative state.
II. THE SEMINOLE ROCK DEFERENCE DOCTRINE
Before analyzing the Paralyzed Veterans doctrine and Mortgage
Bankers case, it is valuable to briefly examine the Seminole Rock
doctrine, which was implicated by the Supreme Court’s decision.
Accordingly, this Part begins by summarizing the facts and the
Court’s ruling in Seminole Rock.32 Next, it identifies the legal
foundation for establishing the doctrine that was not specified by the
Court until nearly half a century later. Last, it introduces the recent
28. Id. (addressing Paralyzed Veterans doctrine only).
29. Id. See Part II.
30. See Ferguson v. Moore-McCormack Lines, Inc., 352 U.S. 521, 529 (1957) (Frankfurter,
J., dissenting) (describing “rule of four”).
31. See Leske, Between Seminole Rock and a Hard Place, supra note 5, at 244–71
(describing the Supreme Court’s interpretation and application of the Seminole Rock doctrine).
32. Bowles v. Seminole Rock & Sand Co., 325 U.S. 410 (1945).
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cases where the Court has demonstrated an interest in the doctrine to
help place the opinions in the Mortgage Bankers case in context.
A. Bowles v. Seminole Rock & Sand Co.
In the Supreme Court’s 1945 decision in Seminole Rock, the
Court created the standard to apply when courts review an agency’s
interpretation of its own regulation.33 Under Seminole Rock, a court
must defer to an agency’s interpretation of its regulation unless it “is
plainly erroneous or inconsistent with the regulation.”34
In Seminole Rock, the Court was required to analyze “Maximum
Price Regulation No. 188,” which mandated “each seller shall charge
no more than the prices which he charged during the selected base
period of March 1 to 31, 1942.”35 This regulation had been enacted
under the Emergency Price Control Act of 1942, which was aimed at
preventing inflation during World War II by controlling prices.36
The controversy involved whether Seminole Rock & Sand had
violated the regulation by negotiating a contract to sell crushed stone
for more than the price established during the base period.37 Chester
Bowles, the Administrator of the Office of Price Administration,
sought to enjoin Seminole Rock & Sand from selling based on the
fact that there had been an actual delivery in March 1942 for a lower
price.38 Although it conceded it had delivered crushed stone for a
lower price, Seminole Rock & Sand argued that there must have
been both a charge and a delivery at a given price to fix the ceiling
price.39 Because the contract for that delivery occurred in October
1941, it asserted the ceiling limit had not been exceeded.40
The district court held Seminole Rock & Sand had not violated
the Maximum Price Regulation and, on appeal, the Fifth Circuit
affirmed.41 Thus, the central issue for the Supreme Court was
whether Seminole Rock & Sand charged a price that was greater than
the maximum established during the regulatory period.42 The Court
first noted the Administrator’s interpretation of the regulation would
33.
34.
35.
36.
37.
38.
39.
40.
41.
42.

Id. at 411.
Id. at 414.
Id. at 413.
Id. at 411, 413.
Id. at 412, 415.
Id.
Id. at 415.
Id.
Id. at 412–13.
Id. at 413.
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only be helpful if the regulation was ambiguous.43 If ambiguous, the
Court found “a court must necessarily look to the administrative
construction of the regulation.”44 And as to the deference a court
should afford an agency’s view, the Court held “the ultimate
criterion is the administrative interpretation, which becomes of
controlling weight unless it is plainly erroneous or inconsistent with
the regulation.”45
The Court found the regulation contained an ambiguous phrase:
“highest price charged during March, 1942.”46 It then looked to the
“administrative construction” of the regulation set forth in a bulletin
issued at the time the Maximum Price Regulation was issued.47
Based on “the consistent administrative interpretation” set forth in
the Bulletin interpreting that phrase, the Court found that the highest
price of an actual delivery during March 1942 established the price
ceiling.48 Thus, in deferring to the agency’s interpretation of the
regulation, the Court reversed the judgment of the court of appeals.49
B. A Brief Doctrinal Explanation of Seminole Rock
In its opinion in Seminole Rock, the Court did not provide a
justification for giving the agency’s interpretation “controlling
weight unless it is plainly erroneous or inconsistent with the
regulation.”50 The basis for the Seminole Rock standard emerged in
two cases over thirty years later.
In the 1991 case of Martin v. Occupational Safety & Health
Review Commission,51 the Court stated that judicial deference to
agency interpretations was rooted in the agency’s delegated
lawmaking powers. That same year, in Pauley v. BethEnergy Mines,
Inc.,52 the Court further explained the authority to interpret
43. Id. at 413–14.
44. Id. at 414.
45. Id.
46. Id. at 415.
47. Id. at 417.
48. Id. at 415, 418. The Court also seemed to place significant weight on the fact that the
public had been placed on notice of this consistent interpretation. Id. at 417–18.
49. Id. at 418.
50. Id. at 414.
51. 499 U.S. 144, 151 (1991) (“Because applying an agency’s regulation to complex or
changing circumstances calls upon the agency’s unique expertise and policymaking prerogatives,
we presume that the power authoritatively to interpret its own regulations is a component of the
agency’s delegated lawmaking powers.”) (citation omitted). For additional background on
Martin, see Leske, Between Seminole Rock and a Hard Place, supra note 5, at 227.
52. 501 U.S. 680 (1991).
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regulations was embedded in the delegation to an agency by
Congress.53 And the controlling deference standard of Seminole Rock
applied by courts to these interpretations naturally follows from this
congressional delegation.54
During these cases, the Court did not critically analyze the
doctrine or identify any perceived problems associated with the
Seminole Rock standard. Nor did the doctrine garner any immediate
attention by either scholars or the justices. And in the following
years, the Supreme Court and appellate courts began developing
various factors to look to when applying the standard without regard
to whether those factors were consistent with the doctrine’s
underpinnings or might otherwise be problematic.55 But nonetheless
the standard developed into an immensely important principle of
administrative law that has largely “lurked beneath the surface and
evaded scholarly and judicial criticism.”56
C. The Supreme Court’s Recent Interest in Seminole Rock
Although the Court has been somewhat faithfully applying the
Seminole Rock standard ever since it established the doctrine in
1945, it has not further elaborated on its foundation or engaged in a
meaningful analysis of the doctrine.57 But this is not to say that
members of the Court have not signaled their apprehension of
applying the standard or of granting an agency controlling deference
in some cases. For instance, Justice Thurgood Marshall warned that
Seminole Rock deference must not be “a license for an agency

53. Id. For further background on Pauley, see Leske, Between Seminole Rock and a Hard
Place, supra note 5.
54. Pauley, 501 U.S. at 698 (“As delegated by Congress, then, the Secretary’s authority to
promulgate interim regulations ‘not . . . more restrictive than’ the HEW [Health, Education, and
Welfare] interim regulations necessarily entails the authority to interpret HEW’s regulations and
the discretion to promulgate interim regulations based on a reasonable interpretation thereof.
From this congressional delegation derives the Secretary’s entitlement to judicial deference.”).
55. Leske, Between Seminole Rock and a Hard Place, supra note 5, at 248–71 (describing
factors applied in U.S. Supreme Court). For a detailed analysis of the interpretation of the courts
of appeals, see Leske, Splits in the Rock, supra note 7.
56. Angstreich, supra note 5, at 99 (The Seminole Rock deference doctrine has “lurked
beneath the surface and evaded scholarly and judicial criticism.”); Leske, Between Seminole
Rock and a Hard Place, supra note 5, at 229 (asserting that unlike Chevron, the Seminole Rock
deference doctrine has “gone largely unexamined”).
57. For a detailed review of the Supreme Court’s interpretation and application of the
Seminole Rock doctrine, see Leske, Between Seminole Rock and a Hard Place, supra note 5, at
248–71.
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effectively to rewrite a regulation through interpretation.”58
Similarly, Justice Clarence Thomas (joined by three colleagues)
opined “agency rules should be clear and definite so that affected
parties will have adequate notice concerning the agency’s
understanding of the law.”59
Yet only within the last five years have justices suggested they
would consider reassessing the doctrine, including an explicit
statement to that effect by Chief Justice Roberts during the Court’s
2012–2013 Term.60 And as the opinions in the Mortgage Bankers
case demonstrate, there are now enough members of the Court
interested in the Seminole Rock doctrine to make a future grant of a
writ of certiorari in a case that raises the issue a virtual certainty.
Justice Scalia’s brief concurrence in the Court’s June 2011
decision in Talk America, Inc. v. Michigan Bell Telephone Co.,61
signaled his first of several efforts to make his colleagues aware of
his newfound skepticism toward the Seminole Rock doctrine.62 In
Talk America, the Court was called upon to decide whether the
Telecommunications Act mandates that local telephone service
providers offer competitors use of their transmission facilities at
cost-based
regulated
rates.63
After
determining
the
Telecommunications Act provision at issue and that the Federal
Communications Commission’s (FCC) regulations were ambiguous,
the Court looked to the FCC’s interpretation of its regulations.64
Applying the Seminole Rock standard, the Court stated the
application of the doctrine was dispositive: “The FCC as amicus
curiae has advanced a reasonable interpretation of its regulations,
and we defer to its views.”65
58. Mullins Coal Co. of Va. v. Dir., Office of Workers’ Comp. Programs, U.S. Dep’t of
Labor, 484 U.S. 135, 170 (1987) (Marshall, J., dissenting) (referencing Bowles, 325 U.S. at 414).
See generally Leske, Between Seminole Rock and a Hard Place, supra note 5 (reviewing
development of the doctrine).
59. Thomas Jefferson Univ. v. Shalala, 512 U.S. 504, 525 (1994) (Thomas, J., dissenting).
60. Decker v. Nw. Envtl. Def. Ctr., 133 S. Ct. 1326, 1338–39 (2013) (Roberts, C.J.,
concurring).
61. 131 S. Ct. 2254 (2011).
62. Id. at 2265–66 (Scalia, J., concurring) (discussing how he would reach the same holding
as the majority without relying on the Seminole Rock doctrine, since “the FCC’s [Federal
Communications Commission’s] interpretation is the fairest reading of the orders in question”).
63. Id. at 2257 (majority opinion).
64. Id. at 2260–61. The FCC’s interpretation was that facilities must be made available if
they were to be used “to link the incumbent provider’s telephone network with the competitor’s
network for the mutual exchange of traffic.” Id. at 2257.
65. Id. at 2265. The FCC was not a party to the litigation but submitted an amicus curiae
brief. Id.
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Despite having joined the opinion of the Court, Justice Scalia
wrote separately to make known his disinclination to accept the
Seminole Rock doctrine any longer: “For while I have in the past
uncritically accepted that rule, I have become increasingly doubtful
of its validity.”66 He ended his brief concurrence by announcing,
“We have not been asked to reconsider Auer in the present case.
When we are, I will be receptive to doing so.”67
In the 2012 case of Christopher v. SmithKline Beecham Corp.,68
the Court explicitly declined to grant the Department of Labor
(DOL) Seminole Rock deference.69 In SmithKline Beecham, the
Court analyzed whether the DOL’s regulation defining “outside
salesman” included pharmaceutical sales representatives.70 After
reviewing the DOL regulations and DOL’s interpretation, it analyzed
whether Seminole Rock deference should apply.71 Despite
recognizing that deference was generally appropriate, the Court
noted, “[T]his general rule does not apply in all cases.”72
The Court looked to instances where it had declined to grant
Seminole Rock deference, such as “when there is reason to suspect
that the agency’s interpretation ‘does not reflect the agency’s fair and
considered judgment on the matter in question.’”73 After exploring
these contours, the Court refused to grant Seminole Rock deference
to DOL’s interpretation.74 While the Court did not express
66. Id. at 2266 (Scalia, J., concurring). Justice Scalia opined the doctrine encourages
agencies to enact vague regulations, potentially violates the separation of powers doctrine,
“frustrates the notice and predictability purposes of rulemaking, and promotes arbitrary
government.” Id. He also referred to the Seminole Rock doctrine as “Auer deference.” Id.
67. Id.
68. 132 S. Ct. 2156 (2012).
69. Id. at 2166–67. To support its decision to withhold agency deference, the Court cited
several past cases, some of which are not even part of the Seminole Rock/Auer line of cases. Id.
(referencing Martin v. Occupational Safety & Health Review Comm’n, 499 U.S. 144, 158 (1991)
and NLRB v. Bell Aerospace Co., 416 U.S. 267, 295 (1974)).
70. Id. at 2161.
71. Id. at 2166.
72. Id.
73. Id. at 2166 (quoting Auer v. Robbins, 519 U.S. 452, 462 (1997)). The Court detailed two
instances when an agency’s interpretation might not reflect its fair and considered judgment:
“when the agency’s interpretation conflicts with a prior interpretation,” id. (citing Thomas
Jefferson Univ. v. Shalala, 512 U.S. 504, 515 (1994)), and when an agency’s interpretation
appears to be “nothing more than a ‘convenient litigating position,’” or a ‘“post hoc
rationalizatio[n]’ advanced by an agency seeking to defend past agency action against attack,”
SmithKline Beecham, 132 S. Ct. at 2166–67 (alteration in original) (citation omitted) (quoting
Auer, 519 U.S. at 462).
74. SmithKline Beecham, 132 S. Ct. at 2168–69. The Court found that acceptance of the
DOL’s interpretation would not give fair warning to the public and would constitute “unfair
surprise.” Id. at 2167 (citation omitted).
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reservation with the existence of the Seminole Rock doctrine vel non,
it does represent the Court acknowledged the doctrine had
limitations.75
Following these cases, the Seminole Rock doctrine appeared at
the forefront of two opinions in 2013 penned in Decker v. Northwest
Environmental Defense Center.76 At issue in Decker was whether
storm water runoff channeled from logging roads fell within a
regulation promulgated under the federal Clean Water Act (CWA)
defining discharges into navigable waters.77 The United States,
appearing as amicus curiae, asserted “[t]he EPA [Environmental
Protection Agency] interprets its regulation to exclude the type of
storm water discharges from logging roads at issue.”78 The Court
found this to be a “reasonable interpretation of its own regulation,”
and applying the Seminole Rock standard deferred to this
interpretation.79 It explained not only was the “EPA’s
interpretation . . . a permissible one,” but “there is no indication that
the [EPA’s] current view [was] a change from prior practice or a post
hoc justification adopted in response to litigation.”80
Once again, Justice Scalia wrote separately express his disdain
for the Seminole Rock doctrine.81 He decried “[e]nough is enough”
with respect to “giving agencies the authority to say what their rules
mean . . . under the harmless-sounding banner of” Seminole Rock
deference.82 Prior to turning to facts at issue, he summed up his
problem with the Seminole Rock doctrine as follows: “[H]owever
75. Id. at 2167.
76. 133 S. Ct. 1326, 1326 (2013).
77. Id. at 1330. A permit for such runoff is necessary if the discharge is “deemed to be
‘associated with industrial activity.’” Those terms are interpreted under the Clean Water Act
(CWA) and the implementing regulations issued by the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA).
Id. (citation omitted). In turn, an EPA regulation defines “the term ‘associated with industrial
activity’ to cover only discharges ‘from any conveyance that is used for collecting and conveying
storm water and that is directly related to manufacturing, processing or raw materials storage
areas at an industrial plant.’” Id. (citation omitted).
78. Id. at 1331.
79. Id.
80. Id. at 1329–30, 1337 (citing Christopher v. SmithKline Beecham Corp., 132 S. Ct. 2156,
2166–67 (2012)).
81. Id. at 1339 (citing Talk America, Inc.,131 S. Ct. at 2266 (Scalia, J., concurring in part
and dissenting in part)). Justice Scalia also distinguished this case from Talk America, where the
“agency’s interpretation of the rule was also the fairest one, and no party had asked [the Court] to
reconsider.” Id. Here, he argued, the application of the Seminole Rock doctrine “ma[de] the
difference.” Id.
82. Id. (citing Talk America, Inc. v. Mich. Bell Tel. Co., 131 S. Ct. 2254, 2266 (2011)
(Scalia, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part)).
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great may be the efficiency gains derived from Auer deference,
beneficial effect cannot justify a rule that not only has no principled
basis but contravenes one of the great rules of separation of powers:
He who writes a law must not adjudge its violation.”83
Justice Scalia’s opinion, standing alone, represented a
significant milestone in the emerging debate on the Seminole Rock
doctrine. But the concurring opinion of Chief Justice Roberts, joined
by Justice Alito, was also notable for its clear goal to make the legal
community aware that there were members of the Court interested in
the Seminole Rock line of cases.84 Moreover, the opinion
acknowledged that Justice Scalia’s opinion had raised “serious
questions about the principle set forth” in Seminole Rock and Auer.85
Based on the justices’ opinions in Decker, as well as in Talk
America and SmithKline Beecham, it seemed beyond serious dispute
that the Court would accept a case for review with the goal of
reevaluating the Seminole Rock doctrine.86 But now, given the
Court’s opinions in Mortgage Bankers, this event is inevitable. With
that in mind, exploring the Mortgage Bankers case yields several
important results. First, the analysis provides additional support for
the need to re-examine Seminole Rock for doctrinal, rather than
pragmatic, reasons as soon as possible. Next, the analysis serves a
valuable point of reference for practitioners seeking to bring a case
involving the Seminole Rock doctrine to the Supreme Court. Finally,
the analysis contributes to the scarce, but now growing, scholarship
in this important area of federal administrative law.
III. THE PARALYZED VETERANS DOCTRINE AND THE
MORTGAGE BANKERS CASE
A. Introduction
The recent case of Mortgage Bankers has thrust the Seminole
Rock deference doctrine into the spotlight. To help understand the
justices’ impetus for highlighting the Seminole Rock doctrine in this
83. Id. at 1342. Justice Scalia would have determined regulation’s meaning by applying
“familiar tools of textual interpretation,” such as the fairest reading of the regulations. Id.
84. Id. at 1339 (Robert, C.J., concurring) (making the legal bar “aware that there is some
interest in reconsidering” Seminole Rock and Auer).
85. Id. at 1338 (Roberts, C.J., concurring) (citing Bowles v. Seminole Rock & Sand Co., 325
U.S. 410 (1945) and Auer v. Robbins, 519 U.S. 452, 462 (1997)). (The chief justice noted
although “[i]t may be appropriate to reconsider that principle in an appropriate case,” he “would
await a case in which the issue is properly raised and argued.”).
86. See infra Part III.
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case, this section briefly explores the Paralyzed Veterans doctrine
and the journey of the Mortgage Bankers case to the Supreme Court.
B. The Paralyzed Veterans Doctrine
In Paralyzed Veterans of America v. D.C. Arena L.P.,87 the
Paralyzed Veterans of America (PVA) brought suit in the United
States District Court for the District of Columbia under the
Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA).88 The PVA maintained the
wheelchair seating to be built in the new MCI Center in Washington,
D.C., must provide lines of sight over standing spectators.89
In the ADA, Congress mandated that the U.S. Department of
Justice (DOJ) promulgate regulations implementing this
requirement.90 At issue in the case was a regulation called Standard
4.33.3, which states:
Wheelchair areas shall be an integral part of any fixed
seating plan and shall be provided so as to provide people
with physical disabilities a choice of admission prices and
lines of sight comparable to those for members of the
general public . . . . At least one companion fixed seat shall
be provided next to each wheelchair seating area. When the
seating capacity exceeds 300, wheelchair spaces shall be
provided in more than one location.91
The main controversy between the parties was whether the
requirement for there to be “lines of sight comparable to those for
members of the general public” meant that wheelchair seats be
situated to allow sightlines over standing spectators.92 DOJ
interpreted this phrase to require all wheelchair seats provide a clear
line of sight.93 DOJ’s interpretation, however, appeared to “constitute
. . . a fundamental modification of its previous interpretation.”94
87. 117 F.3d 579 (D.C. Cir. 1997).
88. Id. at 580; 42 U.S.C. §§ 12181 et seq. (1994).
89. Paralyzed Veterans of Am., 117 F.3d at 580; see 42 U.S.C. § 12182(a) (“No individual
shall be discriminated against on the basis of disability in the full and equal enjoyment of the
goods, services, facilities, privileges, advantages, or accommodations of any place of public
accommodation by any person who owns, leases (or leases to), or operates a place of public
accommodation.”); see also 42 U.S.C. § 12183(a)(1) (2012) (requiring that new facilities subject
to the ADA must be “readily accessible to and usable by individuals with disabilities”).
90. Paralyzed Veterans of Am., 117 F.3d at 580; see 42 U.S.C. § 12186(b).
91. Paralyzed Veterans of Am., 117 F.3d at 580–81 (citing 28 C.F.R. Part 36, App. A,
§ 4.33.3 (1996)).
92. Id. at 586.
93. Id. at 582.
94. Id. at 586.

390

LOYOLA OF LOS ANGELES LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 49:375

In analyzing this issue, the D.C. Circuit found, “Once an agency
gives its regulation an interpretation, it can only change that
interpretation as it would formally modify the regulation itself.”95 In
other words, the DOJ was required to go through the process of
notice-and-comment rulemaking if it had definitively interpreted the
regulation at issue and now wanted to alter its prior interpretation.96
The court explained agencies do not have the identical leeway to
change their interpretations of regulations as they do when they
change their interpretations of statutory provisions.97 The district
court reasoned that an animating principle under Chevron deference,
which applies to the review of an agency’s interpretation of a statute,
is that “Congress has delegated implicitly to administrative agencies
and departments the authority to reconcile, within reason,
ambiguities in statutes that the agencies and departments are charged
with administering.”98 And this delegation is “a continuing one” so
that an agency may change its initial interpretation to take a different
one (so long as it remains a reasonable construction of the statute).99
The court further explained that although the deference doctrine
relating to an agency’s interpretation of its regulation and the
deference doctrine that applies to an agency’s interpretation of a
statute (established in Chevron) are “analogous,” Congress has “said
more . . . on the subject of regulations” in the APA.100 It pointed out
that under the APA, agencies must follow notice-and-comment
procedures while developing regulations, which includes “repeal” or
“amendments” of regulations.101 With this requirement in mind, the
court concluded “to allow an agency to make a fundamental change
in its interpretation of a substantive regulation without notice and
comment obviously would undermine those APA requirements.”102
In the end, however, the court found that DOJ had not initially
set forth an authoritative interpretation of the phrase “lines of sight
comparable” so as to constitute an amendment or modification of its

95. Id.
96. Id.; see 5 U.S.C. § 553 (1982) (APA notice-and-comment provision).
97. Paralyzed Veterans of Am., 117 F.3d at 586.
98. Id. (emphasis in original) (citing Kelley v. Envtl. Prot. Agency, 15 F.3d 1100, 1108
(D.C. Cir. 1994); Oil, Chem. & Atomic Workers Int’l Union v. NLRB, 46 F.3d 82, 90 (D.C. Cir.
1995), cert. denied, 516 U.S. 821 (1995).
99. Paralyzed Veterans of Am., 117 F.3d at 586 (citing Chevron, 467 U.S. at 863).
100. Id. at 586; 5 U.S.C. §§ 551 et seq. (2012).
101. Paralyzed Veterans of Am., 117 F.3d at 586 (citing 5 U.S.C. §551(5)).
102. Id.
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prior view.103 Nonetheless, the case was soon regarded as having
created the Paralyzed Veterans doctrine: “Once an agency gives its
regulation an interpretation, it can only change that interpretation as
it would formally modify the regulation itself: through the process of
notice and comment rulemaking.”104
C. Mortgage Bankers’ Journey to the Supreme Court
Before reaching the Supreme Court, the Mortgage Bankers case
was heard by the U.S. District Court for the District of Columbia and
then on appeal in the U.S. Court of Appeals for the District of
Columbia Circuit. A brief summary of their decisions follows.
Interestingly, neither court mentioned the Seminole Rock doctrine.
1. The District Court’s Decision
In Mortgage Bankers Association v. Solis,105 the Mortgage
Bankers Association (MBA), a national trade association that
represents the real estate finance industry, filed suit in the United
States District Court for the District of Columbia seeking declaratory
and injunctive relief against the Department of Labor (DOL) under
the APA.106 More specifically, MBA sought review of a DOL
administrative interpretation that had conflicted with a previous DOL
interpretation.107
The case involved the Fair Labor Standards Act (FLSA), where
DOL had promulgated regulations to implement the FLSA.108 In
general, the FLSA requires covered employers to pay overtime
wages to employees who work more than forty hours per week.109
However, there are exemptions in the FLSA such as one in section
213(a)(1), which provides “any employee employed in a bona fide
executive, administrative, or professional capacity[,] . . . or in the
capacity of outside salesman (as such terms are defined and
delimited from time to time by regulations of the Secretary . . .),” is
103. Id. at 587.
104. Id. at 586. The court revisited (and re-affirmed) this holding later in Alaska Professional
Hunters Ass’n v. Federal Aviation Administration, 177 F.3d 1030, 1034 (D.C. Cir. 1999), but the
doctrine is most often cited as the Paralyzed Veterans doctrine.
105. 864 F. Supp. 2d 193 (D.D.C. 2012).
106. Id. at 195. The defendants were Hilda Solis, in her official capacity as secretary of the
United States Department of Labor, Nancy Leppink, in her official capacity as deputy
administrator of the Wage and Hour Division of DOL, and DOL itself. Id.
107. Id. at 195.
108. Id.; 29 U.S.C. §§ 201–19 (2012).
109. Solis, 864 F. Supp. 2d at 195–96; 29 U.S.C. § 207(a)(1).
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exempt from the “[m]inimum wage and maximum hour
requirements” otherwise required by the Act.110
Over the years, DOL had allegedly changed its interpretation of
the scope of the exemption.111 Of specific interest to MBA was
whether certain employees, such as mortgage loan officers, were
subject to the FLSA exemption (meaning that they would not be
eligible for over-time pay).112 For example, the DOL had released
various opinion letters, as well as issued an administrative
interpretation bulletin on the issue, which had explicitly withdrawn
one of the previous opinion letters.113 In this bulletin, DOL allegedly
changed its position by suggesting mortgage loan officers were not
exempt from overtime pay requirements. It was this new
interpretation that MBA challenged arguing, under the Paralyzed
Veterans doctrine, the DOL was required to go through the process
of notice-and-comment rulemaking to make such a change.114
The district court began its analysis noting as a threshold matter
it was permissible for an agency to change “its initial interpretation
to adopt another reasonable interpretation.”115 But to do so under
binding D.C. Circuit precedent the court further recognized that the
Paralyzed Veterans doctrine might compel the agency to follow the
notice-and-comment provisions.
The court then addressed arguments by DOL that the Paralyzed
Veterans doctrine conflicted with U.S. Supreme Court precedent.116
For example, DOL asserted that the Court in Vermont Yankee
Nuclear Power Corp. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc.117
held the APA’s notice-and-comment provisions “established the
maximum procedural requirements which Congress was willing to
have the courts impose upon agencies in conducting rulemaking
procedures.”118 According to DOL, because the Paralyzed Veterans
doctrine requires an agency to follow the notice-and-comment
110. Solis, 864 F. Supp. 2d at 196; 29 U.S.C. § 213(a)(1).
111. Solis, 864 F. Supp. 2d at 196–201.
112. Id. at 198.
113. Id. at 201.
114. Id. MBA also argued that the bulletin conflicted with existing DOL regulations and was
therefore arbitrary, capricious, an abuse of discretion, and otherwise not in accordance with law
under the APA. Id.; Paralyzed Veterans of Am. v. D.C. Arena L.P., 117 F.3d 579, 586 (D.C. Cir.
1997).
115. Solis, 864 F. Supp. 2d at 203 (citing Paralyzed Veterans of Am., 117 F.3d at 586).
116. Id. at 204.
117. 435 U.S. 519 (1978).
118. Solis, 864 F. Supp. 2d at 203; Vt. Yankee, 435 U.S. at 524.
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process if the agency wants to change a prior interpretation of its
own regulations, such a requirement constitutes an additional
procedural requirement and is impermissible.119
Without addressing the merits of DOL’s argument, the court
found it was bound to adhere to controlling circuit precedent.120 It
noted Vermont Yankee had been decided close to twenty years before
Paralyzed Veterans so that the district court was “presumably aware”
of Vermont Yankee when it created the doctrine.121 Moreover, it
observed that the Paralyzed Veterans case has “remained good law
in this Circuit for almost fifteen years.”122
The court likewise dismissed DOL’s argument that the
Paralyzed Veterans doctrine was invalidated by the Court’s 2009
decision in FCC v. Fox Television Stations, Inc.123 There, DOL
argued, the Court found the APA made no distinction “between
initial agency action and subsequent agency action undoing or
revising that action.”124 The district court, however, distinguished
Fox Television on the basis that the Court was focused on whether
the new interpretations contained in administrative orders at issue
were arbitrary and capricious―not whether the new interpretations
needed to have gone through the notice-and-comment process.125
Therefore, the court found the Paralyzed Veterans doctrine remained
the dispositive case on point.126
Next, the court addressed DOL’s argument that two “purported
exceptions” to the Paralyzed Veterans doctrine applied.127 First,
according to DOL, the doctrine should not apply (i.e., it should not
have to go through notice-and-comment rulemaking) unless the
challenging party “substantially and justifiably” relied on the
previous interpretation.128 Second, it asserted an “invalid prior
interpretation” exception found in another D.C. Circuit case should
apply.129

119.
120.
121.
122.
123.
124.
125.
126.
127.
128.
129.

Solis, 864 F. Supp. 2d at 204.
Id. (quoting United States v. Torres, 115 F.3d 1033, 1036 (D.C. Cir.1997)).
Id.
Id. at 205.
Id.; FCC v. Fox Television Stations, Inc., 556 U.S. 502 (2009).
Solis, 864 F. Supp. 2d at 205 (citing Fox Television, 556 U.S. at 515).
Id.
Id.
Id. at 205–06.
Id. (citing MetWest Inc. v. Sec’y of Labor, 560 F.3d 506 (D.C. Cir. 2009)).
Id. at 206 (citing Monmouth Med. Ctr. v. Thompson, 257 F.3d 807 (D.C. Cir. 2001)).
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With respect to whether a showing of substantial and justifiable
reliance on the prior interpretation was required for the Paralyzed
Veterans doctrine to apply, the court agreed with DOL that it was.130
It found that a “core tenant” of the Paralyzed Veterans doctrine line
of cases was a “substantial and justifiable reliance on a wellestablished agency interpretation.”131 And because MBA had not met
its burden to demonstrate sufficient reliance, the court held noticeand-comment rulemaking was not required under the Paralyzed
Veterans doctrine.132
2. The Decision by the Court of Appeals
Although, as discussed above, the district court assessed many
arguments raised by both parties, the only issue presented to the
court of appeals was whether a party’s justifiable reliance on a
previous interpretation is “a separate and independent requirement”
when determining whether the Paralyzed Veterans doctrine
applies.133 Significantly, DOL conceded on appeal that if the court
found reliance was not a separate requirement, then the Paralyzed
Veterans doctrine would apply thereby requiring them to go through
the notice-and-comment process for its revised interpretation.134
In analyzing the issue, the court of appeals rejected the lower
court’s view that previous D.C. Circuit opinions held a party
must demonstrate “substantial and justifiable reliance on a
well-established agency interpretation.”135 To the contrary, the court
found there was no separate reliance element under the Paralyzed
Veterans doctrine.136
The court explained the Paralyzed Veterans analysis consists of
two elements: a definitive interpretation and a significant change in
such interpretation.137 It rejected the view that some of its more
recent cases had grafted an “independent third element: substantial
and justified reliance.”138 The court explained the view that inquiring
whether there had been reliance was merely part of the analysis as to
130. Id. at 207.
131. Id. at 208 (citing MetWest, 560 F.3d at 511).
132. Id. at 210.
133. Mortgage Bankers Ass’n v. Harris, 720 F.3d 966, 967–68 (D.C. Cir. 2013).
134. Id. at 968.
135. Id. at 969 (quoting Solis, 864 F. Supp. 2d at 204–05).
136. Id. at 968.
137. Id. at 969.
138. Id. (citing Honeywell Int’l, Inc. v. Nuclear Regulatory Comm’n, 628 F.3d 568 (D.C. Cir.
2010) and MetWest Inc. v. Sec’y of Labor, 560 F.3d 506 (D.C. Cir. 2009)).
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whether the agency had set forth a “definitive interpretation.”139 It
reasoned that “significant reliance functions as a rough proxy for
definitiveness” because “regulated entities are unlikely to
substantially—and often cannot be said to justifiably—rely on
agency pronouncements lacking some or all the hallmarks of a
definitive interpretation.”140
Finally, the court rejected the DOL’s argument that “the only
way to protect agencies from inadvertently locking in disfavored,
informally promulgated positions is to impose a separate and
independent reliance element.”141 It found since a party’s reliance
should properly be treated as part of the definitiveness analysis,
agencies will be adequately protected without making reliance a
distinct element.142 The court therefore found for MBA and
remanded the case with instructions to vacate the DOL’s bulletin
containing the new interpretation.143
IV. CHIPPING AWAY AT THE ROCK
A. Introduction
As my past articles on Seminole Rock detailed, the Supreme
Court and lower courts have somewhat consistently applied the
doctrine over the past seventy years.144 Yet it is not until very
recently that justices have begun to analyze the doctrine critically.
With respect to the Seminole Rock doctrine, several key observations
can be made.
First, the Supreme Court’s Seminole Rock doctrine jurisprudence
shows a more searching review on whether to defer than the standard
seems to require. But these opinions also show substantial
inconsistency, even confusion, on how they interpret and apply the
standard.145
Second, it is evident that at least four justices would like to hear
a case that raises the doctrine, so that the full Court can re-examine
the doctrine. This is supported by the views expressed by Chief

139.
140.
141.
142.
143.
144.
145.

Id. at 970.
Id.
Id. at 971.
Id. at 971–72.
Id. at 972.
Leske, Between Seminole Rock and a Hard Place, supra note 5, at 235.
Id.
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Justice Roberts and Justices Scalia, Thomas, and Alito in recent
opinions.146
Third, it is safe to say that at least two justices (Justices Scalia
and Thomas) would like to over-turn the Seminole Rock doctrine.
Other members, however, have shown allegiance to the doctrine
without thorough examination.147
Fifth, and in sum, based on the recent interest and recognized
importance of the Seminole Rock doctrine in our administrative state,
Supreme Court review is certainly imminent where it will re-evaluate
the doctrine.
Therefore, the goal of this Part is to explain how the Court
addressed the Seminole Rock doctrine and related administrative law
issues in the recent case of Perez v. Mortgage Bankers Association.
In addition, given the Court’s interest in re-evaluating the doctrine in
a future case, another goal of this Part is to facilitate the Court’s
consideration of the doctrine. As such, this Part seeks to provide
additional insight on the justices’ views on the Seminole Rock
doctrine.
B. The Court’s Majority Opinion
After making its way through the D.C. Circuit, Mortgage
Bankers was heard by the Supreme Court in its 2014–2015 term.148
On March 9, 2015, the Court released its opinion with Justice
Sotomayor delivering the judgment on behalf of a unanimous
court.149 In addition, Justices Scalia, Thomas, and Alito each penned
separate opinions concurring in the judgment.150 The central question
presented in the case was whether the Paralyzed Veterans doctrine
was consistent with the APA.151 And although the case did not
directly raise the Seminole Rock doctrine, it was clear from the
concurring opinions that the doctrine was directly on the minds of
several justices.
The Court began by introducing and summarizing the applicable
provisions in the APA that federal administrative agencies institute

146. See infra.
147. See infra.
148. Perez v. Mortgage Bankers Ass’n, 135 S. Ct. 1199 (2015).
149. Id.
150. Id. at 1210 (Alito, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment); id. at 1211
(Scalia, J., concurring in the judgment); id. at 1213 (Thomas, J., concurring in the judgment).
151. Id. at 1203; see 5 U.S.C. § 551 (2012).
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when they promulgate rules.152 It noted the APA rulemaking
provision also applies when agencies amend or repeal an existing
rule, which is broadly defined to encompass “statement[s] of general
or particular applicability and future effect” that are intended to
“implement, interpret, or prescribe law or policy.”153
The process, set forth in APA section 553, which has been
called “notice and comment rulemaking,” requires agencies to
complete three steps.154 The agency must first give “notice” to the
public, which is normally accomplished by publishing a notice of
proposed rulemaking in the Federal Register.155 Next, the agency is
required to “give interested persons an opportunity to participate in
the rule making through submission of written data, views, or
arguments”156 and then the agency must consider and reply to such
comments.157 Finally, the APA requires an agency to include “a
concise general statement of [the rule’s] basis and purpose” in its
final rule.158 These notice-and-comment rules, the Court explained,
have the “force and effect of law” and have become known as
“legislative rules.”159
The Court next distinguished legislative rules from other types
of rules, which are not subject to the notice-and-comment
rulemaking process, such as “interpretative rules, general statements
of policy, or rules of agency organization, procedure, or practice.”160
It focused on interpretive rules noting that such rules are “issued by
an agency to advise the public of the agency’s construction of the
statutes and rules which it administers.”161 Although it is generally
easier for an agency to issue an interpretive rule (because it does not

152. Perez, 135 S. Ct. at 1203; see 5 U.S.C. § 551.
153. Perez, 135 S. Ct. at 1203; 5 U.S.C. §§ 551(4)–(5).
154. Perez, 135 S. Ct. at 1203; 5 U.S.C. § 553.
155. Perez, 135 S. Ct. at 1203; 5 U.S.C. § 553(b).
156. Perez, 135 S. Ct. at 1203; 5 U.S.C. § 553(c).
157. Perez, 135 S. Ct. at 1203; see Citizens to Pres. Overton Park, Inc. v. Volpe, 401 U.S.
402, 416 (1971); Thompson v. Clark, 741 F.2d 401, 408 (D.C. Cir. 1984).
158. Perez, 135 S. Ct. at 1203; 5 U.S.C. § 553(c).
159. Perez, 135 S. Ct. at 1203 (quoting Chrysler Corp. v. Brown, 441 U.S. 281, 302–03
(1979)).
160. Id. at 1203–04; 5 U.S.C. § 553(b)(A). The Court noted that the APA does not define the
term “interpretive rule” and “its precise meaning is the source of much scholarly and judicial
debate.” Id. at 1204 (citing generally Richard J. Pierce, Jr., Distinguishing Legislative Rules from
Interpretative Rules, 52 ADMIN. L. REV. 547 (2000); Manning, Nonlegislative Rules, 72 GEO.
WASH. L. REV. 893 (2004)). The Court declined to “wade into that debate here.” Id.
161. Perez, 135 S. Ct. at 1204 (quoting Shalala v. Guernsey Mem’l Hosp., 514 U.S. 87, 99
(1995)).
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have to complete the notice-and-comment process), such rule does
not have “the force and effect of law.”162
Turning to the facts, the Court explained how the case involved
DOL’s changing views on whether mortgage loan officers were
covered by the FLSA’s minimum-wage and overtime compensation
requirements.163 In 1999 and 2001, the DOL had determined in
separate opinion letters that mortgage loan officers were not exempt
from these requirements.164 In 2004, DOL promulgated regulations,
using notice-and-comment procedures, suggesting that they might no
longer be eligible.165
Following the promulgation of these regulations, in 2006, the
DOL issued yet another opinion letter, this time finding that
mortgage loan officers were not subject to protection.166 The Court
observed that this position was short-lived because in 2010 DOL
changed course again by finding that because mortgage loan officers
“have a primary duty of making sales for their employers,” they are
protected under the FLSA’s wage and overtime provisions.167 As
with its other opinion letters, the DOL did not follow notice-andcomment procedures when issuing its 2010 interpretation.168
The Court explained it was the 2010 interpretation that gave rise
to the litigation.169 It briefly summarized both the opinion of the
district court granting summary judgment to DOL and the opinion of
162. Id. (quoting Shalala, 514 U.S. at 99).
163. Id. at 1204–05; see 52 Stat. 1060, as amended, 29 U.S.C. §§ 201 et seq.
164. Perez, 135 S. Ct. at 1204–05 (citing Loan Officers/Exempt Status, [6A WHM], Lab. Rel.
Rep. (BNA) 99:8351 (Feb. 16, 2001) and Mortgage Loan Officers/Exempt Status, [6A WHM],
Lab. Rel. Rep. (BNA) 99:8249 (May 17, 1999)).
165. Id. at 1205. The Court noted that the 2004 regulations featured a new section that
contained several examples of employees who would not be eligible for minimum-wage and
overtime compensation. Id. at 1204. (See 29 C.F.R. § 541.203 (2014)). For example, certain
“[e]mployees in the financial services industry” would not be protected unless their “primary duty
is selling financial products.” Id. (citing 29 C.F.R. § 541.203(b)).
166. Id. at 1205 (citing U.S. Dep’t of Labor, Wage & Hour Div., Opinion Letter, at 70a–84a
(Sept. 8, 2006), http://www.dol.gov/whd/opinion/FLSA/2006/2006_09_08_31_FLSA.pdf.
167. Id. (citing U.S. Dep’t of Labor, supra note 166, at 49a, 69a). DOL rescinded the 2006
opinion letter and explained that the reasoning in the letter had improperly relied on “misleading
assumption[s] and selective and narrow analysis” of the issue. Id. (citing U.S. Dep’t of Labor,
supra note 166, at 68a).
168. Id. at 1205.
169. Id. The Court reviewed MBA’s argument that DOL’s interpretation was inconsistent
with the 2004 regulation and was therefore arbitrary and capricious under the APA, 5 U.S.C.
§ 706 (2012). Id. The Court also explained MBA’s argument that DOL’s interpretation was
“procedurally invalid in light of the D.C. Circuit’s decision in Paralyzed Veterans.” Id. It also
noted how three former mortgage loan officers, named Beverly Buck, Ryan Henry, and Jerome
Nickols, had intervened to support the DOL’s interpretation. Id.
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the D.C. Circuit reversing the lower court’s decision.170 The Court
then turned to the central question of whether the Paralyzed Veterans
doctrine was consistent with the APA.171 Simply put, it had no
problem concluding the doctrine was “contrary to the clear text of
the APA’s rulemaking provisions.”172
In finding that the Paralyzed Veterans doctrine “improperly
impose[d] on agencies an obligation beyond the ‘maximum
procedural requirements’ specified in the APA,” the Court turned to
the plain text of the APA.173 The Court explained the APA explicitly
provides that unless “notice or hearing is required by statute,” the
notice-and-comment requirement “does not apply . . . to
interpretative rules.”174 Because of the categorical exemption of
interpretive rules from the APA’s notice-and-comment provisions,
the Court found the Paralyzed Veterans doctrine was fatally
flawed.175
The Court faulted the D.C. Circuit for ignoring this crucial
provision when it analyzed the 2010 interpretation, which qualified
as an interpretive rule.176 The D.C. Circuit had been correct when it
concluded that the APA requires an agency to use the same
procedure (such as notice and comment for legislative rules) when
amending or repealing a rule as it does when it issues the rule in the
first place.177 But the court of appeals had failed to account for the
APA’s exemption for interpretive rules from the notice-andcomment requirements that apply to legislative rules.178
In other words, since an agency does not have to adhere to the
notice-and-comment requirements when issuing an initial
170. Id.; Solis, 864 F. Supp. 2d at 209–10 (finding on summary judgment that the 2010
interpretation was not arbitrary or capricious); Harris, 720 F.3d at 971–72 (concluding that
reliance was not a required element of the Paralyzed Veterans doctrine and holding that because
DOL had conceded that it had made a prior, conflicting interpretation, its 2010 interpretation had
to be vacated).
171. Perez, 135 S. Ct. at 1205.
172. Id. at 1205–06.
173. Id. (citing Vt. Yankee Nuclear Power Corp. v. Nat. Res. Def. Council, Inc., 435 U.S.
519, 524 (1978)).
174. Id. at 1206 (quoting 5 U.S.C. § 553(b)(A); see also 5 U.S.C. § 553(b) (“[N]otice of
proposed rulemaking shall be published in the Federal Register.”); id. § 553(c) (“[T]he agency
shall give interested persons an opportunity to participate in the rule making.”).
175. Id. at 1206.
176. Id.
177. Id.
178. Id. (citing 5 U.S.C. § 551(5)). See FCC v. Fox Television Stations, Inc., 556 U.S. 502,
515 (2009) (The APA “make[s] no distinction . . . between initial agency action and subsequent
agency action undoing or revising that action.”).
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interpretive rule, it does not have to follow those procedures if it
subsequently chooses to amend or repeal that interpretive rule.179 The
Court reasoned such a conclusion was harmonious “with
longstanding principles of . . . administrative law jurisprudence.”180
Under prior precedent, courts are not empowered “to impose upon
[an] agency its own notion of which procedures are ‘best’ or most
likely to further some vague, undefined public good,” beyond what is
required under the APA.181 The Court stated “[t]o do otherwise
would violate ‘the very basic tenet of administrative law that
agencies should be free to fashion their own rules of procedure.’”182
The Court further explained the Paralyzed Veterans doctrine’s
requirement that an agency must go through notice and comment for
an interpretive rule is precisely an example of a “judge-made
procedural right” that is the “responsibility of Congress or the
administrative agencies, not the courts” to fashion.183 In the Court’s
view, Congress had “weighed the costs and benefits of placing more
rigorous procedural restrictions on the issuance of interpretive rules,”
but “decided to adopt standards that permit agencies to promulgate
freely such rules—whether or not they are consistent with earlier
interpretations.”184
Next, the Court addressed MBA’s arguments on why the
Paralyzed Veterans doctrine should be found permissible.185 It first
rejected MBA’s attempt to “bolster the D.C. Circuit’s reading of the
APA” by arguing that a change in interpretation should qualify as a
“repeal” or “amendment” of a regulation so as to require notice-andcomment rulemaking.186 The Court found MBA’s argument
unpersuasive because MBA had failed to reconcile that because
179. Perez, 135 S. Ct. at 1206.
180. Id. at 1207.
181. Id.
182. Id. (quoting Vt. Yankee Nuclear Power Corp. v. Nat. Res. Def. Council, Inc., 435 U.S.
519, 549 (1978)).
183. Id.; see also Vt. Yankee Nuclear Power Corp., 435 U.S. at 524 (Section 4 of the APA
“established the maximum procedural requirements which Congress was willing to have the
courts impose upon agencies in conducting rulemaking procedures.”); id. (“Agencies are free to
grant additional procedural rights in the exercise of their discretion, but reviewing courts are
generally not free to impose them if the agencies have not chosen to grant them.”).
184. Perez, 135 S. Ct. at 1207 (citing Vt. Yankee Nuclear Power Corp., 435 U.S. at 523 (In
enacting the APA, Congress “settled long-continued and hard-fought contentions, and enact[ed] a
formula upon which opposing social and political forces have come to rest.”) (quoting another
source)).
185. Id.
186. Id. (quoting Vt. Yankee Nuclear Power Corp., 435 U.S. at 544, 549).
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interpretive rules do not have the force and effect of law, a change in
an interpretation of a regulation cannot be deemed to have amended
or repealed that regulation.187
The Court directed most of the remainder of its opinion
explaining why the “practical and policy grounds” raised by MBA to
defend the Paralyzed Veterans doctrine were unconvincing.188 In
particular, the Court addressed MBA’s assertion the Paralyzed
Veterans doctrine stops “agencies from unilaterally and unexpectedly
altering their interpretation of important regulations.”189
The Court first acknowledged there might be instances when an
agency might choose to release an interpretive rule, instead of a
legislative rule, in order to side-step the notice-and-comment
requirement.190 However, the Court explained affected parties have
the ability to address such situations.191 For example, it highlighted
the APA’s “arbitrary and capricious” standard imposes the
requirement that an agency supply “more substantial justification
when ‘its new policy rests upon factual findings that contradict those
which underlay its prior policy; or when its prior policy has
engendered serious reliance interests that must be taken into
account.’”192
The Court also was comforted by the fact that Congress, when
drafting statutes, is aware agencies do sometimes change their
interpretation, negatively affecting parties’ expectations.193 The
Court noted Congress’s inclusion of “safe harbor” provisions to
shield parties that have relied on past interpretations.194 And it cited
to one example found in the FLSA, which states “no employer shall
be subject to any liability” for failure “to pay minimum wages or
overtime compensation” if it shows that the “act or omission
complained of was in good faith in conformity with and in reliance
on any written administrative regulation, order, ruling, approval, or
interpretation” of the Administrator of the Department’s Wage and

187. Id. at 1207–08.
188. Id. at 1209.
189. Id. (citing Brief for Respondent at 16, Perez v. Mortgage Bankers Ass’n, 135 S. Ct. 1199
(2015) (Nos. 13-1041, 13-1052)).
190. Id. at 1209.
191. Id.
192. Id. (quoting Fox Television Stations, 556 U.S. at 515 (citation omitted)).
193. Id.
194. Id.
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Hour Division, even when the guidance is later “modified or
rescinded.”195
Finally, the Court refused to address MBA’s argument that if the
Paralyzed Veterans doctrine is invalid, DOL’s 2010 interpretation is
still impermissible because it should “be classified as a legislative
rule”—not an interpretive rule.196 The Court explained, “[T]he
parties litigated this suit on the understanding that the
Administrator’s Interpretation was—as its name suggests—an
interpretive rule.”197 Indeed, the Court quipped, that MBA itself had
seemed to concede that DOL’s interpretation was an interpretive rule
in raising the Paralyzed Veterans doctrine because the doctrine only
applies to interpretive rules.198 Moreover—and more importantly—
the Court found MBA had waived its argument by not raising it in
the lower courts or in its brief in opposition to certiorari.199 The
Court reversed the judgment of the D.C. Circuit.200
C. Justice Alito’s Opinion
Justice Alito concurred in part and concurred in the judgment.201
He first opined the Paralyzed Veterans doctrine was “incompatible”
with the APA.202 His opinion, however, did not focus on the
Paralyzed Veterans doctrine or the facts presented in Mortgage
Bankers. Switching gears, he recognized the D.C. Circuit might very
well have fashioned the Paralyzed Veterans doctrine to address the
“aggrandizement of the power of administrative agencies.”203 Such
power, in his view, resulted from a combination of Congress’s
delegation of broad lawmaking authority to agencies; agencies’
exploitation of the gray-area between legislative and interpretive
rules; and the Seminole Rock deference doctrine.204
Although Justice Alito did not discount these issues, he viewed
the D.C. Circuit’s creation of the Paralyzed Veterans doctrine as “not

195.
196.
197.
198.
199.
200.
201.
III-B).
202.
203.
204.

Id. (citing 29 U.S.C. §§ 259(a), (b)(1) (2012)).
Id. at 1210.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. (citing SUP. CT. R. 15.2; Carcieri v. Salazar, 555 U.S. 379, 395–96 (2009)).
Id. (Alito, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment) (declining to join Part
Id.
Id.
Id.
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a viable cure for these problems.”205 He further noted the Court could
readily address one of the contributors to the amassment of agency
power: the Seminole Rock doctrine.206 He cited to the separate
opinions of both Justice Scalia and Justice Thomas to highlight
“substantial reasons why the Seminole Rock doctrine may be
incorrect.”207 He concluded his short concurrence by announcing he
was “await[ing] a case in which the validity of Seminole Rock may
be explored through full briefing and argument.”208
D. Justice Scalia’s Opinion
In his concurring opinion, Justice Scalia agreed with both the
decision and reasoning on why the Paralyzed Veterans doctrine
could not be reconciled with the APA.209 But he then made clear that
he did not agree with the “Court’s portrayal of the result” as being
justifiable in light of Congress’s desire to allow agencies leeway to
issue interpretive rules.210 Justice Scalia then immediately focused on
the Court’s deference doctrines and on the Seminole Rock doctrine,
in particular. He asserted the current deference doctrines that apply
to agency determinations have skewed the balance that Congress
originally sought when it created the APA.211 In other words, as a
result of the Court’s development of an “elaborate law of deference
to agencies’ interpretation of statutes and regulations,” agencies
effectively can now “authoritatively resolve ambiguities” in both
statues and regulations.212
Justice Scalia explained as a result of the dramatic growth of our
administrative state, the APA was enacted as a “check” to agency
“zeal.”213 One principal method was to create the notice-andcomment provisions, which, as the name suggests, requires an
agency to notify the regulated community of the proposed rule,
solicit comments on the rule, consider and reply to comments, and
205. Id.
206. Id.
207. Id.; see also Christopher v. SmithKline Beecham Corp., 132 S. Ct. 2156, 2168–69 (2012)
(citing, inter alia, John F. Manning, Constitutional Structure and Judicial Deference to Agency
Interpretations of Agency Rules, 96 COLUM. L. REV. 612 (1996)).
208. Perez, 135 S. Ct. at 1210–11 (Alito, J., concurring in part and concurring in the
judgment).
209. Id. at 1211 (Scalia, J., concurring in the judgment).
210. Id.
211. Id.
212. Id.
213. Id. (citing United States v. Morton Salt Co., 338 U.S. 632, 644 (1950)).
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then to justify the final rule or decision when the rule is
completed.214 He pointed out another restraint on agency action was
the APA’s requirement that it was the court’s role to then “interpret
constitutional and statutory provisions, and determine the meaning or
applicability of the terms of an agency action.”215 Thus, according to
Justice Scalia, Congress empowered courts to have the authoritative
role to resolve ambiguities in statutes and regulations.216
Although Justice Scalia conceded Congress carved out
interpretive rules from these requirements, he asserted the import of
this exemption has gone way beyond what Congress intended.217
Properly construed and when read in conjunction with the
commitment to courts to decide what regulations and statutes mean,
Justice Scalia reasoned that the APA’s interpretive rules exemption
does not augment an agency’s power.218 This is so because although
an agency can use a legislative rule to inform the public of its
interpretation of the law, it should not effectively bind the public
(and does not have the force of law) because the reviewing court has
the final word.219
But in Justice Scalia’s view, the Court’s deference doctrines,
including the Seminole Rock doctrine, has upended this balance.220
As a result of the application of these agency deference doctrines
during judicial review, the interpretive rules exemption from notice
and comment has expanded an agency’s power.221 Instead of using
interpretive rules as a method to notify the public, agencies can now
bind the public because the agency will receive deference for its
interpretation in its interpretive rule.222 Justice Scalia quipped
“[i]nterpretive rules that command deference do have the force of
law.”223
Justice Scalia next criticized the majority for failing to
adequately address this unintended result.224 Although (as the Court
214. Id.
215. Id. (citing 5 U.S.C. § 706 (2012)).
216. Id.
217. Id. (citing 5 U.S.C. §§ 553(b)–(c)).
218. Id.
219. Id. at 1211–12 (Scalia, J., concurring in the judgment).
220. Id. at 1211. Justice Scalia also pointed out the Court has been relying on Seminole Rock
even though it was decided before the APA was enacted. Id.
221. Id.
222. Id. at 1211–12 (Scalia, J., concurring in the judgment).
223. Id. at 1212 (Scalia, J., concurring in the judgment) (emphasis in original).
224. Id.
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had asserted) it is a court that “ultimately decides whether [the text]
means what the agency says,” he asserted such a role is illusory
when the court is required to defer under the controlling deference
standard established under cases such as Chevron and Seminole
Rock.225 Moreover, the end result means that agencies are able to
make binding rules without following the notice-and-comment
provisions in the APA.226
Next, Justice Scalia zeroed in that the deference afforded to
agency interpretation of its own regulations was especially
problematic.227 In his view, Seminole Rock deference not only
permits an agency to create binding regulations that are not subject to
notice and comment, but allows an agency an even greater
opportunity to expand its power than when it interprets statutory
provisions.228 By creating broad and vague substantive regulations,
an agency can later interpret these regulations through interpretive
rules, which do not require notice and comment, and receive
controlling deference for such interpretations.229 Congress, Justice
Scalia contended, never envisioned this result in creating the APA.230
Justice Scalia concluded by musing what should be done to
address these substantial concerns.231 He acknowledged the creation
of the Paralyzed Veterans doctrine by the D.C. Circuit was a
“courageous (indeed, brazen) attempt” to address the problem as it
relates to a revision of an earlier interpretation.232 But he recognized
that the doctrine could not be supported due to the APA’s
crystal-clear exemption for interpretive rules from notice-andcomment procedures.233 He then proposed a solution that would
“restore the balance originally struck by the APA with respect to an
agency’s interpretation of its own regulations”: abandon Seminole
Rock.234 Such a result, in his view, would allow the APA to be

225. Id.; see Bowles v. Seminole Rock & Sand Co., 325 U.S. 410 (1945); see Chevron,
U.S.A., Inc. v. Nat. Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837 (1984).
226. Perez, 135 S. Ct. at 1212 (Scalia, J., concurring in the judgment).
227. Id.
228. Id.
229. Id.
230. Id.
231. Id. at 1212–1213 (Scalia, J., concurring in the judgment).
232. Id. at 1212.
233. Id.
234. Id. at 1213 (Scalia, J., concurring in part, dissenting in part).
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applied as written with no deference to agencies’ interpretations of
their regulations.235
E. Justice Thomas’s Opinion
Justice Thomas also concurred in the Court’s holding that the
Paralyzed Veterans doctrine was incompatible with the APA.236 And
he too wrote separately because the Paralyzed Veterans and
Mortgage Bankers cases “call into question the legitimacy” of the
Seminole Rock doctrine.237 But unlike the short opinions of Justice
Alito and Justice Scalia, Justice Thomas’s opinion comprehensively
laid out his view on the merits of the doctrine.238 In his view,
Seminole Rock deference amounts to granting legal effect to an
agency’s interpretation—rather than to the regulation itself.239 In
doing so, he asserted that the doctrine “effects a transfer of the
judicial power to an executive agency,” thereby “raising
constitutional concerns.”240 He concluded that the deference regime
established by Seminole Rock undercuts the courts’ duty to be a
judicial check on the other branches and it “subjects regulated parties
to precisely the abuses that the Framers sought to prevent.”241
Justice Thomas first reviewed the genesis of the doctrine by
briefly exploring the Court’s opinion in Seminole Rock.242 He then
asserted this “unsupported” standard “has taken on a life of its
own.”243 Canvassing the “broad spectrum of subjects” where the
Seminole Rock doctrine has been applied,244 he further observed the
doctrine had been used when analyzing an agency’s interpretation of
different agency’s regulations;245 when an agency had interpreted a
regulation inconsistently over time;246 when interpretations were

235. Id.
236. Id. (Thomas, J., concurring in the judgment).
237. Id.
238. Id. at 1213–25.
239. Id. at 1213.
240. Id.
241. Id.
242. Id.
243. Id. at 1214.
244. Id. (citing Robertson v. Methow Valley Citizens Council, 490 U.S. 332, 358–59 (1989)
(forests); Ehlert v. United States, 402 U.S. 99, 104–05 (1971) (Selective Service); INS v. Stanisic,
395 U.S. 62, 72 (1969) (deportation); Udall v. Tallman, 380 U.S. 1, 16–17 (oil and gas leases)).
245. Id. (citing Pauley v. BethEnergy Mines, Inc., 501 U.S. 680, 696–99 (1991)).
246. Id. (citing Long Island Care at Home, Ltd. v. Coke, 551 U.S. 159, 170–71 (2007)).
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issued both formally and informally;247 and even in case that did not
involve “traditional agency regulations,” criminal sentencing.248
In what Justice Thomas viewed as a “steady march toward
deference,” he observed the only meaningful effort to cabin the
doctrine was a sole case where the Court found an agency
interpretation “plainly erroneous” under Seminole Rock in order to
prevent an agency “under the guise of interpreting a regulation, to
create de facto a new regulation.”249 And this “narrow limit” to the
controlling deference standard, in his view, does not make up for
constitutional infirmities inherent in the doctrine.250
Justice Thomas first criticized the Court for on one hand
stressing the importance of “separation of powers” and “the
constitutional system of checks and balances” as being “essential to
the protection of individual liberty,” but on the other hand applying a
“‘more pragmatic, flexible approach’ to that design when it has
seemed more convenient to permit the powers to be mixed.”251 He
then proceeded to chart the history of the U.S. Constitution’s
“particular blend of separated powers and checks and balances.”252
In particular, he discussed “events of the 17th and 18th
centuries” as having played a pivotal role in educating the framers of
the Constitution.253 For example, he pointed to the English Civil War
as having exposed political theorists to “the conflict between the
King and Parliament, and the dangers of tyrannical government
posed by each, they began to call for a clear division of authority
between the two.”254 Scholars such as John Locke and Baron de
247. Id. (citing Auer v. Robbins, 519 U.S. 452, 462 (1997)).
248. Id. (citing Stinson v. United States, 508 U.S. 36, 44–45 (1993) (finding that the
Sentencing Commission’s commentary on its sentencing guidelines was “analogous to an agency
interpretation of its own regulations, entitled to Seminole Rock deference”)).
249. Id. at 1214–15 (quoting Christensen v. Harris Cty., 529 U.S. 576, 588 (2000)). He also
noted that the Court on two occasions had “expressly found Seminole Rock deference inapplicable
for other reasons.” Id. (citing Christopher v. SmithKline Beecham Corp., 132 S. Ct. 2156, 2168
(2012) and Gonzales v. Oregon, 546 U.S. 243, 256–57 (2006)). See Leske, Between Seminole
Rock and a Hard Place, supra note 5.
250. Id. at 1215.
251. Id. (citing Stern v. Marshall, 131 S. Ct. 2594, 2608–09 (2011) (quoting another source)
and Nixon v. Adm’r of Gen. Servs., 433 U.S. 425, 442 (1977)).
252. Id. (citing M. VILE, CONSTITUTIONALISM AND THE SEPARATION OF POWERS 38, 168–69
(2d. ed. 1998)).
253. Id.
254. Id. (citing VILE, supra note 252, at 44–45, 48–49). Justice Thomas also quoted “a 1648
work titled The Royalist’s Defence that offered perhaps the first extended account of the theory of
the separation of powers: “[W]hilst the Supremacy, the Power to Judge the Law, and Authority to
make new Lawes, are kept in severall hands, the known Law is preserved, but united, it is
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Montesquieu elaborated on this theory and emphasized that
separation of powers was essential to protect individual liberty.255 In
addition, Justice Thomas observed these scholars had also believed
that a system of checks and balances among the branches was
necessary to buttress this separation.256
He then explained the early development of the United States
confirmed that both a separation of powers and checks and balances
was important.257 While many state constitutions of the time did
provide for separation of powers, there were no checks and balances
in place.258 Later, when the Constitution was being drafted, the
Framers, such as Madison, recognized this shortcoming: “experience
has taught us a distrust” of the separation of powers alone as “a
sufficient security to each [branch] [against] encroachments of the
others” and “[i]t is necessary to introduce such a balance of powers
and interests, as will guarantee the provisions on paper.”259
Justice Thomas then described the separation of the main
powers of the United States government into the legislative,
executive, and judicial branches and the numerous examples of
checks and balances to reinforce this separation.260 And according to
Madison, this constitutional paradigm was a “great security” for
liberty.261 Justice Thomas elaborated the Framers viewed the
separation of powers and checks and balances as “practical and real
vanished, instantly thereupon, and Arbytrary and Tyrannicall power is introduced.” Id. (quoting
CHARLES DALLISON, THE ROYALIST’S DEFENCE 80 (1648) (italics in original)).
255. Id. (citing VILE, supra note 252, at 63–64); see also JOHN LOCKE, SECOND TREATISE OF
CIVIL GOVERNMENT, §§ 143–44, at 72 (J. Gough ed., 1947); BARON DE MONTESQUIEU, THE
SPIRIT OF THE LAWS 151–52 (Oskar Piested, ed., Thomas Nugent trans., New York Hafner
Publishing Co. 1949).
256. Id. at 1215–16 (citing VILE, supra note 252, at 72–73, 102).
257. Id. at 1216.
258. Id. (citing VILE, supra note 252, at 147). For instance, states “actively placed traditional
executive and judicial functions in the legislature,” so that some “state legislatures arrogated
power to themselves and began to confiscate property, approve the printing of paper money, and
suspend the ordinary means for the recovery of debts.” Id. (citing G. WOOD, THE CREATION OF
THE AMERICAN REPUBLIC 1776–1787, at 155–56, 403–09 (1969)).
259. Perez, 135 S. Ct. at 1216 (quoting 2 RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787,
at 77 (M. Farrand rev., 1966)).
260. Id. (The Framers “gave Congress specific enumerated powers to enact legislation, Art. I,
§ 8, but gave the President the power to veto that legislation, subject to congressional override by
a supermajority vote, Art. I, § 7, cls. 2, 3. They gave the President the power to appoint principal
officers of the United States, but gave the Senate the power to give advice and consent to those
appointments. Art. II, § 2, cl. 2. They gave the House and Senate the power to agree to adjourn
for more than three days, Art. I, § 5, cl. 4, but gave the President the power, “in Case of
Disagreement between them,” to adjourn the Congress “to such Time as he shall think proper.”
Art. II, § 3, cl. 3.”); see U.S. CONST. arts. I, II, III.
261. Id. (quoting THE FEDERALIST NO. 51, at 321 (James Madison) (C. Rossiter ed., 1961)).
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protections for individual liberty,” which he believed the judiciary
(like the other branches) must protect.262 And to Justice Thomas, the
Seminole Rock doctrine represented the Court’s abdication of this
duty.263
Justice Thomas next detailed his reasoning on why the Seminole
Rock doctrine raises constitutional concerns.264 In his view, the
doctrine results in “a transfer of judicial power to the Executive
Branch, and it amounts to an erosion of the judicial obligation to
serve as a ‘check’ on the political branches.”265
First, Justice Thomas explained once a party invokes the power
of Article III court to hear a case, the court has an obligation to
“exercise its independent judgment in interpreting and expounding
upon the laws.”266 And the Framers knew in many cases there would
arise ambiguities in the law.267 Thus, inherent in the judicial power
was the authority of courts to resolve ambiguities in adjudicating a
case or controversy.268 Justice Thomas observed the legislative and
executive branches are also empowered to interpret the law, but that
“the judicial interpretation would be considered authoritative in a
judicial proceeding.”269
In support of the view that courts should have the role to give
the authoritative view of the law, Justice Thomas explained that
judges were historically understood to be exercising their
independent judgment.270 This “independent judgment” meant that a
judge should follow the law without succumbing to personal biases
262. Id. at 1216–17 (citing Mistretta v. United States, 488 U.S. 361, 426 (1989) (Scalia, J.,
dissenting) (“[The Constitution] is a prescribed structure, a framework, for the conduct of
government. In designing that structure, the Framers themselves considered how much
commingling [of governmental powers] was, in the generality of things, acceptable, and set forth
their conclusions in the document.”)).
263. Id. at 1217.
264. Id.
265. Id.
266. Id. (citing U.S. CONST. art. III, § 1 (“judicial Power of the United States”)).
267. Id. (citing Jonathan T. Molot, The Judicial Perspective in the Administrative State:
Reconciling Modern Doctrines of Deference with the Judiciary’s Structural Role, 53 STAN. L.
REV. 1, 20–21 & n. 66 (2000) and Caleb Nelson, Originalism and Interpretive Conventions, 70
U. CHI. L. REV. 519, 525–26 (2003)); see also id. (quoting James Madison, “All new laws,
though penned with the greatest technical skill and passed on the fullest and most mature
deliberation, are considered as more or less obscure and equivocal,” THE FEDERALIST NO. 37, at
229 (James Madison)).
268. Id. (noting that Alexander Hamilton agreed: “[t]he interpretation of the laws is the proper
and peculiar province of the courts,” THE FEDERALIST NO. 78, at 467 (Alexander Hamilton)).
269. Id.
270. Id.
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or “pressure from the political branches, the public, or other
interested parties.”271 He asserted to better insulate judges, the
Framers built safeguards into the Constitution such as allowing
judges to “hold their Offices during good Behaviour” and receive “a
Compensation, which shall not be diminished during their
Continuance in Office.”272 By contrast, Justice Thomas explained,
the Framers chose to not insulate the legislative and executive
branches from external pressures; instead, the “Constitution tie[s]
them to those pressures.”273
In his view, these differences in the branches support the notion
that “judicial interpretations are definitive in cases and controversies
before the courts.”274 Justice Thomas reasoned courts act as “an
intermediate body between the people and the legislature, in order,
among other things, to keep the latter within the limits assigned to
their authority.”275 Unlike the uninsulated legislature and executive,
which “may be swayed by popular sentiment to abandon the
strictures of the Constitution or other rules of law,” the judiciary “is
duty bound to exercise independent judgment in applying the
law.”276
Justice Thomas then asserted the interpretation of agency
regulations requires such independent judgment because “substantive
regulations have the force and effect of law.”277 And “[a]gencies and
private parties alike can use these regulations in proceedings against
regulated parties.”278 He noted, “Just as it is critical for judges to
exercise independent judgment in applying statutes, it is critical for
judges to exercise independent judgment in determining that a
regulation properly covers the conduct of regulated parties.”279 And

271. Id. at 1218 (quoting Philip Hamburger, LAW AND JUDICIAL DUTY 508–21 (2008)).
272. Id. (citing U.S. CONST. art. III, § 1).
273. Id. (citing U.S. CONST. art. I, § 2, cl. 1 (providing for election of members of the House
of Representatives every two years); U.S. CONST. art. I, § 3, cl. 1 (providing for selection of
members of the Senate every six years); U.S. CONST. art. II, § 1, cl. 1 (providing for the president
to be subject to election every four years.)).
274. Id. at 1219.
275. Id. (citing THE FEDERALIST NO. 78, at 467 (Alexander Hamilton)).
276. Id.
277. Id. (citing United States v. Mead Corp., 533 U.S. 218, 231–32 (2001)).
278. Id. (citing Christopher v. SmithKline Beecham Corp., 132 S. Ct. 2156, 2164–65 (2012)
(private party relying on Department of Labor regulations)); see also FCC v. Fox Television
Stations, Inc., 556 U.S. 502, 515 (2009) (agency issuing notices of liability under regulations).
279. Id. (Thomas, J., concurring in the judgment).
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“[d]efining the legal meaning of the regulation is one aspect of that
determination.”280
Justice Thomas next revealed what his view on the Seminole
Rock doctrine would likely be in a future case. In his view, Seminole
Rock deference nullifies the courts’ role to give their independent
judgment.281 By giving “controlling weight” to an agency’s
interpretation of a regulation, the courts’ power to interpret the
regulation is essentially transferred to the agency.282 In other words,
by taking away traditional tools of interpretation to define the
meaning of a regulation, a judge is instead confined to the narrow
“plainly erroneous or inconsistent with the regulation” standard.283
And because the agency is part of the executive branch and “lacks
the structural protections for independent judgment adopted by the
Framers, including the life tenure and salary protections of Article
III,” “the transfer of interpretive judgment raises serious separation
of powers concerns.”284
He also maintained Seminole Rock was constitutionally suspect
because it undercuts the check by the judiciary on the other
branches.285 Justice Thomas asserted “the enforcement of the rule of
law” is the judiciary’s principal check and that “Article III judges
cannot opt out of exercising their check.”286 But in his view, there is
no proper exercise of independent judgment (i.e., application of the
rule of law) when courts defer to an agency that has both created the
regulation and enforced that same regulation.287 By not engaging in
the exercise of determining what the best interpretation of a
regulation is, courts have abdicated their responsibility to provide a
judicial check.288
Justice Thomas opined, under this deference paradigm, agencies
amass power by permitting them to alter “the meaning of regulations

280. Id.
281. Id.
282. Id. at 1219–20 (citing 1 S. JOHNSON, DICTIONARY OF THE ENGLISH LANGUAGE 499 (4th
ed. 1773) (defining “[d]efer” as “to leave to another’s judgment”)).
283. Id.
284. Id. at 1220.
285. Id.
286. Id. at 1220–21 (noting that “[t]he Judiciary has a responsibility to decide cases properly
before it, even those it ‘would gladly avoid’”) (citation omitted).
287. Id. at 1221.
288. Id.
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at their discretion and without any advance notice to the parties.”289
Although he applauded the D.C. Circuit’s attempt to address this
issue by creating the Paralyzed Veterans doctrine as being
“practically sound,” he recognized the doctrine was “legally
erroneous” because of the plain language of the APA.290 He then
used the facts presented in the case to illustrate his point by pointing
to the 2006 and 2010 interpretations of the DOL.291 If a court were to
give controlling deference to both conflicting interpretations, he
pointed out, “regulated entities are subject to two opposite legal rules
imposed under the same regulation.”292 In other words, a regulation
could have two different meanings, depending on what interpretation
an agency proffered at any given time.
He concluded the important goal of having regulations give
proper notice to regulated parties is not fulfilled under Seminole
Rock’s deference regime.293 Rather, although notice is given through
the promulgation of the regulation, notice is accomplished “only [in]
a limited sense,” because the agency can subsequently interpret it
differently later.294 Therefore, to Justice Thomas, a new
interpretation, which did not go through notice and comment, might
as well be a new regulation.295
Justice Thomas next turned to a discussion that will be of
immense importance when the Court examines the Seminole Rock
doctrine in a future case. In this section, Justice Thomas identifies
and then rejects various theoretical justifications that have been
offered to support the Seminole Rock doctrine.296
First, he responded to the theory that came from one of the
Court’s previous Seminole Rock cases that the doctrine is grounded
in the agency’s experience and expertise when overseeing “‘a
complex and highly technical regulatory program’ in which the
identification and classification of relevant ‘criteria necessarily
require significant expertise and entail the exercise of judgment

289. Id. (finding that this “abandonment permits precisely the accumulation of governmental
powers that the Framers warned against” and citing THE FEDERALIST NO. 47, at 302 (James
Madison)).
290. Id.
291. Id. at 1222.
292. Id.
293. Id.
294. Id.
295. Id. at 1221.
296. Id. at 1222.
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grounded in policy concerns.’”297 To him, this argument fails
because the court’s role is to determine what the regulation means,
rather than to ascertain what the preferred policy choice should be.298
He reasoned since “substantive agency regulations have the ‘force
and effect of law,’” the courts should interpret such regulations like
any other type of law.299 In the end, he asserted the agency-expertise
rationale was more to support “the wisdom of according agencies
broad flexibility to administer statutory schemes” rather than an
agency’s own experience in interpreting its own regulation.300 This
policy-rationale, however, remains cabined by constitutional limits
and thus was unpersuasive as a basis to support the doctrine.301
Second, Justice Thomas addressed the arguments that the
Seminole Rock doctrine was justified because the original intent
behind a particular regulation is best left to the agency that wrote
it.302 He rejected this basis by noting the Court had granted deference
to an agency that had not been the original creator of the
regulation.303 But this point aside, Justice Thomas stressed the
agency’s intent should not be dispositive because “the text of the
regulations . . . have the force and effect of law,” and thus should
remain the focus of the inquiry.304 He pointed out that the APA

297. Id. (quoting Thomas Jefferson Univ. v. Shalala, 512 U.S. 504, 512 (1994)); see Leske,
Between Seminole Rock and a Hard Place, supra note 5, at 253–57 (discussing the Thomas
Jefferson University case).
298. Perez, 135 S. Ct. at 1222.
299. Id. (quoting Hardt v. Reliance Standard Life Ins. Co., 560 U.S. 242, 251 (2010) (stating
courts should “assum[e] that the ordinary meaning of the regulation’s language expresses” its
purpose and enforce it “according to its terms”)).
300. Id. at 1223.
301. Id. (“But policy arguments supporting even useful ‘political inventions’ are subject to the
demands of the Constitution which defines powers and . . . sets out . . . how those powers are to
be exercised.” (quoting INS v. Chadha, 462 U.S. 919, 945 (1983))).
302. Id. (“Because the Secretary [of Labor] promulgates th[e] standards, the Secretary is in a
better position . . . to reconstruct the purpose of the regulations in question.” (quoting Martin v.
Occupational Safety and Health Review Comm’n, 499 U.S. 144, 152 (1991))).
303. Id. (applying “Seminole Rock deference to one agency’s interpretation of another
agency’s regulations because Congress had delegated authority to both to administer the
program” (quoting Pauley v. BethEnergy Mines, Inc., 501 U.S. 680, 696–98 (1991)). He also
pointed out that the Court had “likewise granted Seminole Rock deference to agency
interpretations that are inconsistent with interpretations adopted closer in time to the
promulgation of the regulations.” (citing Long Island Care at Home, Ltd. v. Coke, 551 U.S. 159,
170–71 (2007))).
304. Id. at 1223–24 (emphasis added) (“Citizens arrange their affairs not on the basis of their
legislators’ unexpressed intent, but on the basis of the law as it is written and promulgated.”
(quoting Zuni Pub. Sch. Dist. No. 89 v. Dep’t of Educ., 550 U.S. 81, 119 (2007) (Scalia, J.,
dissenting))).
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rulemaking process applies to the text of a regulation and the
public’s reliance interests are based on that text.305
Third, Justice Thomas responded to the theory that Seminole
Rock deference naturally follows from an implicit delegation from
Congress.306 In other words, “[b]ecause applying an agency’s
regulation to complex or changing circumstances calls upon the
agency’s unique expertise and policymaking prerogatives, . . . the
power authoritatively to interpret its own regulations is a component
of the agency’s delegated lawmaking powers.”307 But in Justice
Thomas’s view, Congress cannot bestow such a power upon the
agency because the Constitution does not grant such a power to
Congress itself.308 Thus, because Congress cannot set forth “a
judicially binding interpretation” of a law or regulation, it cannot
vest an agency with that power.309
To support his view, he pointed to separation of power
principles that require the legislative and judicial power to remain
separate.310 He asserted the Constitution contained an “essential
balance” in which Congress is “possessed of power to ‘prescrib[e]
the rules by which the duties and rights of every citizen are to be
regulated,’ but the power of ‘[t]he interpretation of the laws’ [is] ‘the
proper and peculiar province of the courts.’”311 The power for
agencies to definitively interpret their regulations would therefore
upset this balance especially because “the power to create legally
binding interpretations rests with the Judiciary.”312
Fourth and finally, Justice Thomas responded to a 1907 remark
in a speech that “independence and esteem” of judges might be
called into question by “too much oversight of administrative

305. Id. at 1224 (suggesting that for similar reasons the courts should also not give binding
deference “to post[-]enactment expressions of intent by individual Members of Congress” (citing
Sullivan v. Finkelstein, 496 U.S. 617, 631–32 (1990) (Scalia, J., concurring in part))).
306. Id. (citing Martin, 499 U.S. at 151).
307. Id. (quoting Martin, 499 U.S. at 151).
308. Id.
309. Id. (comparing in a similar context that “[t]he structure of the Constitution does not
permit Congress to execute the laws; it follows that Congress cannot grant to an officer under its
control what it does not possess” (quoting Bowsher v. Synar, 478 U.S. 714, 726 (1986))).
310. Id. (noting the “sharp necessity to separate the legislative from the judicial power”
(quoting Plaut v. Spendthrift Farm, Inc., 514 U.S. 211, 221 (1995))).
311. Id. (citation omitted) (third brackets added) (quoting Plaut, 514 U.S. 211, 222 (1995)).
312. Id. (citing Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 179–80 (1803)).
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matters.”313 He explained his theory that if courts were have to
resolve administrative issues, which “lie close to the public
impatience,” judges would be “expose[d] to the fire of public
criticism.”314 But Justice Thomas quickly dismissed this scenario as
being yet another policy argument that could not trump the
Constitution and its division of power among the branches;
regardless of how unpopular a decision, the judiciary is required to
interpret and apply the law.315
Justice Thomas concluded his concurrence by noting although
the resolution of the Mortgage Bankers case only required the Court
to look to the text of the APA, “closer scrutiny reveal[ed] serious
constitutional questions lurking beneath” with respect to the
Seminole Rock doctrine.316 And although he freely recognized that
stare decisis was an important feature to keep our legal system stable,
he made clear that because the Court’s ultimate goal was “to decide
by our best lights what the Constitution means,” he would overrule
Seminole Rock doctrine in an appropriate case.317
E. The Justices’ Views on the Seminole Rock Doctrine
All the opinions in the Mortgage Bankers case shed light on the
justices’ views on the Seminole Rock doctrine. While it is impossible
to predict whether their views will remain consistent in a future case,
it is possible to make observations based on these opinions.
Although Justice Sotomayor’s opinion announcing the judgment
of the unanimous Court did not directly address the Seminole Rock
doctrine, the judgment itself implicates the doctrine in a significant
way. One main criticism of the doctrine lays at the heart of the
Mortgage Bankers case in that giving an agency controlling
deference for an interpretation of its regulation, as Justice Scalia had
pointed out, can allow an agency to create a new regulation without
going through the notice-and-comment process. Although the D.C.
Circuit attempted to cure this issue by requiring an agency to follow
the notice-and-comment provisions when an agency changes its
interpretation of a regulation, the Court rejected this requirement. In
313. Id. at 1224–25 (quoting Charles Evans Hughes, Speech before the Elmira Chamber of
Commerce (May 3, 1907), in ADDRESSES OF CHARLES EVANS HUGHES, 1906–1916, at 185, 185–
7 (2d ed. 1916)).
314. Id. at 1225.
315. Id. at1225.
316. Id.
317. Id. (quoting McDonald v. Chicago, 561 U.S. 742, 812 (2010) (Thomas, J., concurring)).
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striking down the Paralyzed Veterans doctrine, the Court rejected a
safeguard that courts and scholars had identified as a problem with
the Seminole Rock doctrine. Therefore, the decision removed an
existing safeguard in the D.C. Circuit and other circuits that followed
the Paralyzed Veterans doctrine. Thus, when the Court re-examines
the Seminole Rock doctrine, it will now have to grapple with this
issue when determining whether the doctrine should remain or
whether it needs modification to address the concerns identified by
the other justices.
Next, despite being short, Justice Alito’s opinion is significant
for several reasons. First, there is now virtually no doubt that he will
vote to hear a case that squarely raises a Seminole Rock issue. His
opinion echoes the concurring opinion of Chief Justice Roberts in
Decker that he joined in 2013.318 In that opinion, the chief justice
wrote it “may be appropriate to reconsider [Seminole Rock] in an
appropriate case” where “the issue is properly raised and argued.”319
Thus, Supreme Court practitioners should be able to rely on his vote
to grant certiorari in a future Seminole Rock case.
Second, it is likewise clear that Justice Alito is wary about the
amount of power that agencies have under our current political and
legal scheme—especially as it affects regulated entities.320 He
expressed an “understandable concern” about agency power even
though he voted to strike down the Paralyzed Veterans doctrine.321
Likewise, it is probative that he did not join all of the Court’s
opinion.322 Justice Alito declined to join Part III-B in which the
Court found regulated entities “are not without recourse” when an
agency takes advantage of the grey area between legislative and
interpretive rules.323 The Court had cited to “a variety of constraints
on agency decisonmaking,” including the arbitrary and capricious
standard and the inclusion of “safe harbor” provisions in statutes to
shield regulated entities from liability when they rely on previous
agency interpretation.324
318. Decker v. Nw. Envtl. Def. Ctr., 133 S. Ct. 1326, 1338–39 (2013) (Roberts, C.J.,
concurring).
319. Id.
320. See Perez, 135 S. Ct. at 1210 (Alito, J., concurring in part and concurring in the
judgment).
321. Id.
322. Id. (declining to join Part III-B).
323. Id. at 1209–10.
324. Id.
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It naturally follows that Justice Alito was therefore not in
complete agreement that regulated entities have sufficient recourse to
protect themselves from agency power and consequently he would
likely be amenable to providing a better “check” to agency power.325
His recognition that the Court can address excess agency power
through a re-evaluation of “the validity” of the doctrine similarly
shows that he might vote in favor of scaling back on the doctrine or
even dispensing with the doctrine altogether.326 The question
remains, however, whether Justice Alito’s allegiance to stare decisis
will prove to be an insurmountable impediment him from
overturning the doctrine.
Third, Justice Alito’s opinion is notable for the glaring absence
of Chief Justice Roberts as a signatory. As explained, the chief
justice penned a very similar opinion in 2012, which Justice Alito
joined. It is indeed curious why the chief justice did not join Justice
Alito’s opinion. Possible rationale include his disagreement with
Justice Alito’s language suggesting he agreed with Justice Thomas
and Justice Scalia’s view that Seminole Rock may be incorrect. Or,
given his allegiance to stare decisis, Chief Justice Roberts might
have questioned whether the Court should or could rectify the issue
by overruling Seminole Rock, as Justice Alito seemed to suggest.327
In any event, while it seems likely that based on his concurrence in
Decker, Chief Justice Roberts will also vote to hear a case raising
Seminole Rock in the future, his view on whether Seminole Rock
should be abandoned remains unclear.328
Justice Scalia’s opinion is also significant in several respects.
First, like Justice Alito, it is clear that Justice Scalia would vote to
hear a case raising the Seminole Rock doctrine. His opinion in
Mortgage Bankers, as well as his past opinions highlighting the
doctrine, makes this proposition virtually indisputable.329
Second, unlike determining Justice Alito’s view on the validity
and vitality of the Seminole Rock doctrine, there is no question as to
Justice Scalia’s positions on these issues. His opinion expressly calls
325. See id. at 1210.
326. See id.
327. See id.
328. Decker v. Nw. Envtl. Def. Ctr., 133 S. Ct. 1326, 1338–39 (2013) (Roberts, C.J.,
concurring).
329. See Perez, 135 S. Ct. at 1212 (Scalia, J., concurring in the judgment); Talk America, Inc.
v. Mich. Bell Tel. Co., 131 S. Ct. 2254, 2265 (2011) (Scalia, J. concurring); Decker, 133 S. Ct. at
1326 (Scalia, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
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for the abandonment of the controlling deference standard
established in Seminole Rock.330
Third, however, a more nuanced question remains. Although
Justice Scalia concluded his opinion indicating that he would give
“no deference to the agency . . . whether [its] interpretation is
correct,” it remains to be seen whether he would still endorse any of
the Court’s other deference doctrines that might otherwise apply,
such as the lesser standard established in Skidmore v. Swift & Co.331
Of course, Justice Thomas’s opinion with respect to his view of
the Seminole Rock doctrine speaks for itself. His assessment and
subsequent rejections of the various foundations proposed for
Seminole Rock should help inform the future evaluation of the
doctrine in a future case. But Justice Thomas has often set forth a
“minority” view of the division of constitutional powers and the
judicial role. It is naturally unclear whether he can convince enough
justices to adopt his view—especially since none of the other
concurring justices joined in any part of his opinion. With that said,
with Justice Scalia firmly of a similar view, and Justice Alito and
Chief Justice Roberts on the record as wanting to re-evaluate the
doctrine, it is too early to tell.
Nonetheless, it seems clear that Justice Thomas would likely
endorse any significant change in the doctrine, even if it does not go
so far as an outright rejection of it. This, however, could take on
many forms. Any such modification would have to ensure that the
courts have the ultimate role in determining the meaning of the
regulation thereby preserving the courts’ duty to give their
independent judgment. Whether it would be acceptable to reformulate the current Seminole Rock standard to yield a lesser
deferential standard or whether resorting to the non-controlling
Skidmore standard would be permissible to him is also unclear.
Last, and of special importance, is Justice Thomas’s clear
statement that he is not bound by stare decisis in circumstances when
he believes proper adherence to the Constitution requires deviating
from it. It will be interesting to see, however, whether there will be
enough justices who are willing to go as far as overturning a doctrine
that has been an integral part of our administrative state for the past
seventy years.
330. Perez, 135 S. Ct. at 1212 (Scalia, J., concurring in the judgment).
331. 323 U.S. 134, 140 (1944).
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V. CONCLUSION
Although the Mortgage Bankers decision did not radically alter
the Seminole Rock doctrine as some scholars predicted, it is clear the
various opinions demonstrate a “chipping away” at the Seminole
Rock doctrine. And it is equally clear the Court will reconsider the
doctrine in an appropriate case. It remains to be seen, however,
whether this will lead to a complete fracture, such as an outright
rejection of the doctrine, or simply flakes and fragments, such as a
more structured test or further limits on the doctrine’s application to
address the justices’ concerns.
In sum, the various opinions addressing the Seminole Rock
doctrine demonstrate there are legitimate constitutional concerns
with the doctrine, as well as practical issues. These concerns
combined with the current confusion and inconsistency by the courts
when applying the doctrine strongly militates in favor of
re-evaluating the doctrine as soon as possible. Because our
administrative state relies on consistency and uniformity in order to
promote fairness, the current questions revolving around the
Seminole Rock doctrine considerably hamper these principles.
Therefore, a meaningful reconsideration of the doctrine would be an
important step to bringing clarity in this important area of
administrative law.
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